Negligence in the Paint: The Case for Applying the Risk Contribution Doctrine to Lead Litigation -- A Response to Gray & Faulk by Earle, Peter G. et al.
Pace Environmental Law Review
Volume 26
Issue 1 Winter 2009 Article 5
January 2009
Negligence in the Paint: The Case for Applying the
Risk Contribution Doctrine to Lead Litigation -- A
Response to Gray & Faulk
Peter G. Earle
Fidelma Fitzpatrick
Douglas M. Raines
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pace
Environmental Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. For more information, please contact cpittson@law.pace.edu.
Recommended Citation
Peter G. Earle, Fidelma Fitzpatrick, and Douglas M. Raines, Negligence in the Paint: The Case for
Applying the Risk Contribution Doctrine to Lead Litigation -- A Response to Gray & Faulk, 26 Pace
Envtl. L. Rev. 179 (2009)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol26/iss1/5
\\server05\productn\P\PER\26-1\PER105.txt unknown Seq: 1  2-MAR-09 8:41
Negligence in the Paint: The Case for
Applying the Risk Contribution
Doctrine to Lead Litigation –
A Response to Gray & Faulk
PETER G. EARLE,* FIDELMA FITZPATRICK,**
AND DOUGLAS M. RAINES***
INTRODUCTION
The civil justice system in the United States has long em-
braced two separate, distinct concepts in its evolution.  First, the
common law has historically been regarded as flexible and adapta-
ble, conforming itself equally well to both its rich traditions and
the evolving realities of our modern times.  Second, tort law specif-
ically is rooted in the principle that individuals have a duty to re-
frain from engaging in conduct that may result in foreseeable
harm.  These concepts have intersected at significant times
throughout our jurisprudence when courts adopted legal theories
that compensate a victim for injuries despite his or her inability to
satisfy the requirements of particularized causation: res ipsa lo-
quitor,1 alternative liability, market share liability, and risk con-
tribution liability.  Courts fashioned these theories in rare
instances to address the anomalous cases in which the plaintiff,
through no fault of his or her own, could not readily identify which
tortfeasor, among multiple tortious actors, actually caused his or
her harm.
Once such modification was the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s
adoption of the risk-contribution theory of liability in Collins v.
Ely Lilly & Co.2  In that case, the court noted that “[i]nherent in
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** Partner, Motley Rice, LLP, Providence, Rhode Island.  J.D., American Univer-
sity Law School.
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University Law School.
1. The burden was not always shifted with res ipsa. See, e.g., WILLIAM L. PROS-
SER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 302-05 (Hornbook Series, West Publishing Co.
1941).  See infra Part I.
2. 342 N.W.2d 37 (Wis. 1984).
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the common law is a dynamic principle which allows it to grow
and to tailor itself to meet changing needs within the doctrine of
stare decisis, which, if correctly understood, was not static and did
not forever prevent the courts from reversing themselves or from
applying principles of common law to new situations as the need
arose.”3
For twenty-one years after it was issued, Collins stood alone
in Wisconsin as the only risk contribution case. Then, in 2005, the
court revisited the risk contribution doctrine in Thomas ex rel.
Gramling v. Mallett,4  a case in which a young child had been
poisoned by white lead carbonate pigments manufactured long
ago.5  Like the Collins case, the Thomas case posed questions of
foreseeablity and causation; while Steven Thomas had evidence
that white lead carbonate pigments had poisoned him, he could
not identify the precise manufacturer of those specific white lead
carbonate pigments. The Thomas court determined that when the
pigment manufacturers designed, manufactured, and promoted
white lead carbonate for use as a pigment in residential paint,
they engaged in conduct that would result in foreseeable harm,
thus exposing themselves to tort liability.6
In making the threshold judgment to subject the former man-
ufacturers of white lead carbonate to the risk contribution doc-
trine, the Wisconsin Supreme Court considered several key public
policies.  Specifically, the Thomas court considered the contribu-
tion of the manufacturers to (1) the creation of the risk of harm to
the children who were completely innocent victims;7 (2) the com-
paratively better position of the pigment manufacturers to absorb
the cost of the injury;8 and (3) the need to deter knowingly wrong-
ful conduct that causes harm by manufacturers of widely distrib-
uted products.9
Despite those clearly articulated policy rationales, as well as
the other grounds relied upon by the Thomas court, the decision
3. Id. at 45.
4. 701 N.W.2d 523 (Wis. 2005).
5. Thus far, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has limited the application of the risk
contribution doctrine only to manufacturers of diethylstilbesterol (DES) and manufac-
turers of white lead carbonate.  Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 342 N.W.2d 37 (Wis. 1984);
Thomas ex rel. Gramling v. Mallett, 701 N.W.2d 523 (Wis. 2005).
6. See infra Part I.
7. Thomas, 701 N.W.2d at 557-58.
8. Id. at 558.
9. Id. at n.44.
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol26/iss1/5
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was criticized by John S. Gray and Richard O. Faulk.10 However,
the criticisms are unfounded because they overlook the natural
and well-recognized evolution of the common law in modern soci-
ety; fail to address the very real issues of foreseeability encom-
passed in both the Thomas and Collins decisions; and do not
adequately and accurately recognize the compelling facts unique
to the lead poisoning crisis created by the lead pigment manufac-
turing defendants.
Contrary to the view of Gray and Faulk,11 the courts’ formula-
tions of market share and risk contribution liability do not re-
present radical departures from the core principles of early tort
law.  The evolution of risk contribution and other theories of bur-
den-shifting liability not only compensates for instances in which
the injury-causing tortfeasor is not readily identifiable, but also
accounts for technological advancements that have given birth to
mass tort.12  Specifically, without judicial modification of the com-
mon law, the law would implicitly grant tort immunity to the
10. John S. Gray & Richard O. Faulk, “Negligence in the Air?” Should “Alternative
Liability” Theories Apply in Lead Paint Litigation, 25 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 147 (2008).
11. Id.
12. It is indisputable that a court’s receptivity to modifying the common law to
provide for remedies for industrial (and even perhaps post-industrial) torts carries
profound ramifications.  The breadth of harm caused by DES and by lead has been
astounding.  Numerous sources estimate that the cost of injuries caused by DES is
billions of dollars. See, e.g., Mike D. Murphy, Note, Market Share Liability New York
Style: Negligence in the Air? Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly and Co., 55 MO. L. REV. 1047, 1048-
49 (1990); David A. Fischer, Products Liability: An Analysis of Market Share Liability,
34 VAND. L. REV.1623 (1981); Nlaraine R. Allen, Note, A Remedy for the “DES Daugh-
ters”: Products Liability Without the Identification Requirement, 42 U. PITT. L. REV.
669, 691 (1981); James A. Henderson Jr., Products Liability, DES Litigation: The
Tidal Wave Approaches the Shore, 3 CORP. L. REV. 143, 144 (1980); Naomi Sheiner,
Comment, DES and a Proposed Theory of Enterprise Liability, 46 FORDHAM L. Rev.
963, 968 n.21 (1978).  The costs associated with lead exposure are even more stark.
One group of researchers has estimated the lifetime costs ascribed to the number of
children lead poisoned each year to be $43 billion per annum.  P.J. Landigran et al.,
Environmental Pollutants and Disease in American Children: Estimates of Morbidity,
Mortality, and Costs for Lead Poisoning, Asthma, Cancer, and Developmental Disabil-
ities, 110 ENVTL. HEALTH PERPSP. 721 (2002). Had courts adhered rigidly to outmoded
tenets of tort law, the cost of the harm would have been borne exclusively by those
other than the makers of the harm-producing product. Moreover, to ensure the immu-
nization of tortious actors through strict adherence to the original conception of cause-
in-fact would thwart the fundamental aims of tort law.  Inevitably, some future prod-
uct will cause mass latent injuries, perhaps on a scale wider than those caused by
DES and lead, even to the extent that the product poses a threat to our medical and
educational infrastructure.  The civil law system should not remain so provincial as to
render torts of such magnitude outside the bounds of a legal remedy.  Accordingly, it
is imperative that courts continue to thoughtfully and judiciously provide for civil
resolution.
3
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manufacturers of untraceable, fungible goods that cause wide-
spread harm, despite the indisputable fact that all manufacturers
behaved tortiously in the course of manufacturing and marketing
the goods.
This Article will argue that it is logical, appropriate, and fair
for courts to apply market share and risk contribution liability to
litigation in which lead poisoned children seek redress for their
injuries from the manufacturers of the product that injured them.
Part I of this Article briefly follows the evolution of burden-shift-
ing theories in tort law from res ipsa loquitor, to alternative liabil-
ity, to market share liability to risk contribution liability.  Part II
examines the Thomas decision and seeks to illuminate its sound-
ness.  Part III rebuts arguments advanced by proponents of lead
pigment manufacturers that contend that so-called “alternative li-
ability theories” should not be applied to lead paint litigation.
Part IV argues that it would behoove society for courts to remain
open to extending market share and risk contribution liability to
other contexts that, like DES and lead, reap pervasive and devas-
tating injury. Just as the common law in the pre-industrial era
could not account for unforeseen torts that would occur as a result
of industrialization, it is likely that the present state of tort law
insufficiently accounts for tort injuries that will occur in our
future.
I. BURDEN-SHIFTING THEORIES OF TORT LAW:
RES IPSA LOQUITOR TO RISK
CONTRIBUTION
From time to time courts have encountered factual scenarios
for which the existing common law was ill-suited.  The paradig-
matic scenario is one in which a person incurs an injury, the na-
ture of the injury at minimum suggests that it occurred as a result
of tortious conduct, but the nature of the injury is also such that
the plaintiff is rendered unable to pinpoint the responsible party.
Indeed, such a scenario broadly describes the fact patterns to
which res ipsa loquitor, alternative liability, market share liabil-
ity, and risk contribution liability have been applied.  This Article
briefly examines each doctrine in turn.
A. Res Ipsa Loquitor
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitor originated in English courts
in the nineteenth century to allow plaintiffs, without having to
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol26/iss1/5
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prove causation directly, to present a case to a jury based on cir-
cumstantial evidence that suggests negligent conduct has oc-
curred.13  For instance, in the now infamous case of Byrne v.
Boadle, a barrel of flour fell from a window of the defendant’s
warehouse onto the head of the plaintiff.14  The blow caused the
plaintiff to lose all recollection of the event.  At trial, the issue was
whether the plaintiff was required to prove that the defendant
was in fact negligent.  The court observed that it was impossible
for the plaintiff to ascertain how the barrel fell out of the window
and that, given that a barrel in the defendant’s custody could not
fall from a warehouse window in the absence of negligence, it
would be “preposterous” to require the plaintiff to call witnesses
from the warehouse to prove negligence.  Because the barrel’s fall-
ing constituted prima facie evidence of negligence, the court ab-
solved the plaintiff from proving that negligence occurred, and
instead placed the burden on the defendant to marshal any facts
to show that it was not negligent.
Since Byrne, res ipsa has been honed to reflect a common
sense understanding that an inference of negligence may be raised
without direct evidence of a negligent act so long as three condi-
tions exist: (1) the injury is a type not ordinarily occurring absent
negligence; (2) the defendant retains some control of the instru-
mentality causing injury, or the plaintiff uses an appliance the de-
fendant has manufactured or maintained; and, (3) the plaintiff is
not contributorily negligent.15  Accordingly, res ipsa relaxes the el-
ements of tort by allowing the plaintiff to provide evidence of facts
and circumstances surrounding his injury that lead to a reasona-
ble inference that the defendant acted negligently, rather than re-
quiring the plaintiff to directly prove each element of negligence.
13. See, e.g., WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF LORTS § 39, at 243
n.76 (4th ed. 1971) (citing Scott v. London & St. Katherine Docks Co., 1865, 3H. & C.
596, 159 Eng. Rep. 665). Authorities agree that one of the earliest expressions of res
ipsa loquitor is found in Christi v. Griggs, 1809, 2 Camp. 79, 170 Eng. Rep. 1088 (See
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 39, at 243 n.70), in which the plaintiff,
who was riding in a coach, was injured when an axle broke.  The court observed that
in the context of carrier and passenger, the coach has contracted to ensure a safe
passage; and therefore, the court declared that on the question of negligence, the bur-
den should be on the defendant to show “that the stagecoach was as good as could be
made, and that the driver was as skillful a driver as could anywhere be found.”  170
Eng. Rep. 1088 (quoted in William L. Prosser, Res Ipsa Loquitor in California, 37 CAL.
L. REV. 183, 185 (1949)).
14. See PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 39, at 243 (4th ed. 1971)
(citing Byrne v. Boadle, 1863, 2 H. & C. 722, 159 Eng. Rep. 299).
15. See, e.g., Giles v. City of New Haven, 636 A.2d 1335 (Conn. 1994); Smith v. Eli
Lilly & Co., 560 N.E.2d 324 (Ill. 1990).
5
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By allowing plaintiffs to prove negligence circumstantially rather
than directly, res ipsa is predicated on the notion that lay juries
are infused with sufficient common knowledge to draw reasonable
inferences.16
Res ipsa loquitor is a widely-adopted rule of law.  With only
three exceptions, every state jurisdiction in the United States has
adopted and applies res ipsa.17  And in the case of two of those
exceptions, Michigan and South Carolina, it is agreed those juris-
dictions indeed do apply res ipsa, but under a different name.18
Somewhat surprisingly, the formulation of res ipsa and its
rapid acceptance by courts were met with little resistance; by and
large commentators and judges viewed res ipsa’s relaxation of the
plaintiff’s burden in select cases as a welcome development in the
law.19 An investigation of the early scholarship on the subject
reveals that critics did not so much debate the substantive merit
of res ipsa, but instead locked horns primarily over its procedural
16. See, e.g., WILLIAM L. PROSSER & W. PAGE KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 39, at
243 (5th ed. 1995) (“The gist of res ipsa loquitor . . . is the inference, or process of
reasoning by which the conclusion is reached. This must be based upon evidence
given, together with sufficient background of human experience to justify the conclu-
sion.  It is not enough that plaintiff’s counsel can suggest a possibility of negligence.”).
17. STUART M. SPEISER, THE NEGLIGENCE CASE: Res Ipsa Loqiutor § 1.1, at 4
(1972).
18. Id. at §§ 6:38, at 306, 6:71, at 361. See also John H. Crabb & Kenneth F. John-
son, Res Ipsa Loquitor De Novo, 15 Maine L. Rev. 56 (1963) (“[M]ichigan and South
Carolina state they have formally rejected the concept [of res ipsa loquitor] altogether,
but they in effect apply it under other guises.”).  Michigan applies res ipsa under the
alternative name “circumstantial evidence of negligence,” which Speiser refers to as
the “Michigan equivalent of the res ipsa loquitor doctrine.” SPEISER, supra note 17, at
§ 6:38, at 306 (citing Mitcham v. Detroit, 94 N.W.2d 388 (Mich. 1959)).  Similarly,
South Carolina does not apply res ipsa per se, but courts in that state do hold, a la res
ipsa, that negligence may be proved by circumstantial evidence. SPEISER, supra note
17, at § 6:69, at 358 (citing Chaney v. Burgess, 143 S.E.2d 521 (S.C. 1965); Orr v.
Saylor, 169 S.E.2d 396 (S.C. 1969) (Weatherford, J., dissenting)).
Pennsylvania is the other jurisdiction that is not counted as adopting res ipsa.
However, the Commonwealth has adopted res ipsa, but only in certain circumstances:
(1) when there is contractual privity between the plaintiff and the defendant, and (2)
when the case involves a particularly dangerous commodity. SPEISER, supra note 17,
at § 6:69, at 357.
19. See, e.g., Warren A. Seavey, Res Ipsa Loquitor: Tabula In Naufragio, 63 HARV.
L. REV. 643 (1950).  Seavey was an early critic of res ipsa, but not with respect to the
substantive policy underlying the rule.  His criticism was lodged with respect to its
application in cases involving defendants about whom no inference of negligence can
be drawn. Id. at 651-52.  Despite his criticism that courts had applied res ipsa in ill-
advised cases, Seavey stated: “By and large the rule [of res ipsa loquitor] has been
innocuous . . . .” Id. at 645-46.  Moreover, he in fact praised the aim of the doctrine
itself: “It would seem to be just that where plaintiff has submitted himself or his prop-
erty to another, the other should be under a duty to explain any resulting harm which
would not normally occur without negligence on the defendant’s part.” Id.
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol26/iss1/5
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effect.20 Numerous commentators supported the doctrine as em-
bodying a public policy favoring plaintiffs who experience “ ‘hard-
ship’ in proving a negligence case,” especially in circumstances in
which “increased usage of mechanization” placed the defendant at
“a great, if not total, advantage over the plaintiff in the extent of
opportunity to know or understand how the event came about.”21
In fact, even an early critic of res ipsa praised the aim of the doc-
trine despite the contention that there existed no evidence from
which to infer negligence: “It would seem to be just that where the
plaintiff has submitted himself or his property to another, the
other should be under a duty to explain any resulting harm which
would not normally occur without negligence on the defendant’s
part.”22
20. See, e.g., Louis L. Jaffe, Res Ipsa Loquitor Vindicated, 1 BUFF. L. REV. 1
(1951); Seavey, supra note 19; Crabb & Johnson, supra note 18; John W. Broadfoot,
Comment, Res Ipsa Loquitor and its Application in Georgia, 14 MERCER L. REV. 427
(1963); William L. Prosser, The Procedural Effect of Res Ipsa Loquitor, 20 MINN. L.
REV. 241 (1936); Charles E. Carpenter, Res Ipsa Loquitor: A Rejoinder to Professor
Prosser, 10 SO. CAL. L. REV. 467 (1937); William L. Prosser, Res Ipsa Loquitor: A
Reply to Professor Carpenter, 10 SO. CAL. L. REV. 459 (1937); William L. Prosser, Res
Ipsa Loquitor in California, 37 CAL. L. REV. 183 (1949).
Primarily, the commentators wrestled over whether res ipsa loquitor created a
presumption or an inference. See, e.g., Crabb & Johnson, supra note 18, at 59-61
(“When res ipsa became the subject of discussion by scholars, the focus of their atten-
tion was the problem of procedural effect which the courts had found to be so difficult.
Like the courts, they disagreed about whether res ipsa loquitor operated to create a
presumption or an inference.  The attention of the more recent writers is similarly
directed at the procedural consequences, to the detriment of more fundamental
problems which the historical development of the doctrine has caused them to neg-
lect.”).  The detractors of res ipsa argued that not only did the confusion over the pro-
cedural effect of res ipsa muddy the doctrine, but also its application—whether it
operated to create an inference or a presumption—was unnecessary because it cre-
ated redundancy. The contours of res ipsa, they argued, were not appreciably different
from those situations in which a jury is permitted to make a finding based on circum-
stantial evidence. Consequently, the detractors argued that res ipsa is fairly indistin-
guishable from the rules governing the admission of circumstantial evidence and
therefore res ipsa should be subsumed into those rules. See, e.g., Prosser, Res Ipsa
Loquitor in California, 37 CAL. L. REV. 183 (1949); Warren A. Seavey, Res Ipsa Lo-
quitor: Tabula In Naufragio, 63 HARV. L. REV. 649 (1950); Crabb & Johnson, supra
note 18, at 60-61.
A secondary criticism related to res ipsa stemmed from courts’ deployment of the
doctrine in what commentators deemed to be inappropriate cases. See, e.g., Seavey,
supra note 19; Prosser, 37 CAL. L. REV. 183. Commentators expressed concern that
courts were applying res ipsa in cases in which there was no evidence from which
negligence could be inferred. See Seavey, supra note 19 (citing Ybarra v. Spangard,
154 P.2d 687 (Cal. 1944)).
21. Crabb & Johnson, supra note 18, at 58-59.
22. Seavey, supra note 19, at 646.
7
\\server05\productn\P\PER\26-1\PER105.txt unknown Seq: 8  2-MAR-09 8:41
186 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26
Courts in virtually every jurisdiction agreed.  The courts rec-
ognized both that industrial progress created new circumstances
of injury that an outmoded common law could not redress and that
they had the inherent authority to modify the law to provide re-
dress under new circumstances.23  For instance, in clarifying the
elements of res ipsa loquitor, the Colorado Supreme Court stated
the following in 1958:
It seems a proper sequitor to say that the more we are removed
from “horse and buggy days,” the more intensified and diversi-
fied our industrialism, mechanics and science become, the more
technology and automation advance, the more the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitor should take a stellar role in the law of negli-
gence . . . . The law should march abreast of a highly mecha-
nized and science-developed economy . . . .24
In a dissenting opinion in a 1969 case, a justice of the South
Carolina Supreme Court echoed the Colorado Supreme Court in
voicing his dismay that his state had not adopted res ipsa loquitor
in name (though, he contended that the court had in fact adopted
the rule of res ipsa in substance):
The rule of res ipsa loquitor is a salutary rule of evidence uti-
lized in some form in most jurisdictions in this country.  With
the inexorable advance toward a life wholly dependent upon
complex technology the trend is even to give the rule a more
liberal application.  My concern is that South Carolina presently
is following an inconsistent double standard.  Human rights are
involved as well as property rights. . . .  The law cannot remain
immutable any more than life and its service to society depends
on its ability to meet the challenges of change. . . .  I believe the
time has come for South Carolina to permit its trial courts to
make use of a salutary rule of evidence in the law of negligence.
I would . . . adjudge that the trial courts of South Carolina have
the inherent power to utilize the rule of evidence called res ipsa
loquitor.25
More recently, res ipsa has been lauded as a “logical frame-
work for approaching circumstantial evidence” because it confines
itself to “focusing on the likelihood of essential components of a
23. See, e.g., Weiss v. Axler, 328 P.2d 88 (Colo. 1958).
24. 328 P.2d at 91.
25. Orr v. Saylor, 169 S.E.2d 396, 402 (S.C. 1969) (Weathorford, J., dissenting).
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol26/iss1/5
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plaintiff’s case.”26  These observations of the merits of res ipsa ap-
ply with equal facility to market share and risk contribution liabil-
ity.  Hence, the roots of risk contribution were planted in the
common law long ago; in this respect, risk contribution is neither
the novel theory nor the radical departure that its detractors
claim it is.
B. Alternative Liability
The California Supreme Court established alternative liabil-
ity in Summers v. Tice, holding that two hunters who fired guns
toward a plaintiff acted negligently, and that the burden should
be shifted to each of them to extricate himself from liability.27  It
reasoned that it would be unfair to leave the innocent plaintiff
remediless because he could not pinpoint which tortious defen-
dant caused his injuries.28
In Summers, the plaintiff led two other men on a hunt.  He
advised his cohorts to be careful and to “stay in line” with one an-
other.  However, after the plaintiff proceeded ahead, one of the de-
fendants flushed a quail, which flew in the line where the plaintiff
stood.  Both hunters shot at the quail in the direction of the visible
plaintiff.  The plaintiff incurred shots to his eye and to his lip.29
It was undisputed that one of the hunters was responsible for
causing injury to the plaintiff’s eye, but the plaintiff could not
prove which.30  Under traditional strictures of causation, the
plaintiff’s failure to show which hunter caused his injuries would
have defeated his claim.  However, the court recognized the injus-
tice of such a result, and, consistent with the prevailing view in
legal scholarship, subjected the defendants to joint and several li-
ability, unless one could exonerate himself from fault.31
Citing case precedent, the Restatement of Torts, and Dean
Wigmore, the court concluded that it would produce an untenable
result to exonerate “both wrongdoers” and leave the plaintiff rem-
ediless because the plaintiff found himself “in the unfair position
of pointing to which defendant caused the harm.”32  “Ordinary de-
26. Stephen A. Spitz, From Res Ipsa Loquitur to Diethylstilbestrol: The Uniden-
tifiable Tortfeasor, 65 IND. L. J. 591, 593 (1990).
27. Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948).
28. Id. at 4.
29. Id. at 2.
30. Id. at 3.
31. Id. at 3-5.
32. Summers, 199 P.2d at 4.  For case precedent supporting its conclusion, the
Summers court relied on Oliver v. Miles, 110 So. 666 (Miss. 1926), which, in reviewing
9
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fendants,” the court observed, “are in a far better position to offer
evidence to determine which one caused the injury.”33
Significantly, as a final note, the court indicated that the re-
sult it announced would apply even if the defendants had not ac-
ted jointly, but rather had acted as independent tortfeasors: “If
defendants are independent tortfeasors and thus each liable for
the damage caused by him alone, and, at least, where the matter
of apportionment is incapable of proof, the innocent wronged party
should not be deprived of his right to redress.”34  Thus, precedent
dates back to 1948 for the specific proposition that, when a plain-
tiff is injured by more than one independently acting tortfeasor,
but the plaintiff cannot identify which party caused his injury, the
burden of causation should be shifted to the wrongdoing defend-
ants so that “the innocent wronged party [is] not . . . deprived of
his right to redress.”35
The alternative liability theory enunciated by the Summers
court is deeply rooted in the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor.  Indeed,
the court, in reaching its decision, relied on and analogized its
holding to certain res ipsa cases.  Specifically, the court relied on
the case of Ybarra v. Spangard, a traditional res ipsa loquitor case
issued by the California Supreme Court.36  The Summers court, in
discussing the Ybarra case, observed that in some circumstances
it is just to shift the burden to the defendants to explain the cause
of injury:
a case involving a simultaneous shooting by joint tortfeasors, stated: “We think that
. . . each is liable for the resulting injury to the boy, although no one can say definitely
who actually shot him. To hold otherwise would be to exonerate both from liability,
although each was negligent, and the injury resulted from such negligence.” Oliver,
110 So. 666 (quoted in Summers, 199 P.2d at 3 (emphasis in original)).
The court also found Dean Wigmore’s treatise on torts persuasive.  It quoted the
treatise in relevant part as follows:
When two or more persons by their acts are possibly the sole cause of
harm . . . and the plaintiff has introduced evidence that the one of the two
persons . . . is culpable, then the defendant has the burden of proving that
the other person . . . was the sole cause of harm . . . .  The real reason for
the rule that each joint tortfeasor is responsible for the whole damage is
the practical unfairness of denying the injured person redress simply be-
cause he cannot prove how much damage each did, when it is certain that
between them they did all . . . .
Summers, 199 P.2d at 3-4 (quoting WIGMORE, SELECT CASES ON THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 153 (1912)).
33. 199 P.2d at 4.
34. Id. at 5.
35. Id.
36. Ybarra v. Spangard, 154 P.2d 687 (Cal. 1944).
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol26/iss1/5
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There the Court was considering whether the patient could
avail himself of res ipsa loquitur, rather than where the burden
of proof lay, yet the effect of the decision is that plaintiff has
made out a case when he has produced evidence which gives rise
to an inference of negligence which was the proximate cause of
the injury. It is up to defendants to explain the cause of the in-
jury. It was there said: ”If the doctrine is to continue to serve a
useful purpose, we should not forget that ‘the particular force
and justice of the rule, regarded as a presumption throwing
upon the party charged the duty of producing evidence, consists
in the circumstance that the chief evidence of the true cause,
whether culpable or innocent, is practically accessible to him
but inaccessible to the injured person.’”37
Thus, alternative liability is actually a logical development of
the legal jurisprudence concerning res ipsa loquitor. As with res
ipsa, alternative liability is a long-standing, universally favored
doctrine of law.  It is now embodied in the Restatement (Second) of
Torts:38
Where the conduct of two or more actors is tortious, and it is
proved that harm has been caused to the plaintiff by only one of
them, but there is uncertainty as to which one has caused it, the
burden is upon each such actor to prove that he has not caused
the harm.39
37. Summers, 199 P.2d at 4.
38. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B(3) cmt. h (1965). Interestingly, the
Restatement, in its comments, notes the possibility that this rule of law may require
modification to address factual scenarios heretofore not addressed by courts across
the country.  Specifically, the Restatement notes that:
The cases thus far decided in which the rule stated in Subsection (3) has
been applied all have been cases in which all of the actors involved have
been joined as defendants. All of these cases have involved conduct simul-
taneous in time, or substantially so, and all of them have involved con-
duct of substantially the same character, creating substantially the same
risk of harm, on the part of each actor. It is possible that cases may arise
in which some modification of the rule stated may be necessary because of
complications arising from the fact that one of the actors involved is not
or cannot be joined as a defendant, or because of the effect of lapse of
time, or because of substantial differences in the character of the conduct
of the actors or the risks which they have created. Since such cases have
not arisen, and the situations which might arise are difficult to forecast,
no attempt is made to deal with such problems in this Section. The rule
stated in Subsection (3) is not intended to preclude possible modification
if such situations call for it.
Id.
39. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B(3).
11
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C. Market Share Liability
Market share liability represents the next step in the progres-
sion of burden-shifting doctrines of liability.  Market share liabil-
ity is invoked in circumstances in which a plaintiff is injured by a
fungible product tortiously produced or marketed by multiple
manufacturers, but the circumstances of injury render it impossi-
ble for the plaintiff to identify the manufacturer of the product
which actually injured him.40 Courts applying it apportion liabil-
ity to defendant manufacturers according to their respective mar-
ket share of the product responsible for injuring the plaintiff.41 In
such circumstances, market share liability requires the defen-
dant-manufacturers to prove that they did not produce the injur-
ing product to exculpate themselves from liability.42  As with
alternative liability, market share liability advances the policy
that multiple tortfeasors should not be insulated from liability be-
cause the nature of their conduct renders it impossible for an inno-
cent injured plaintiff to identify which caused the harm suffered.
The California Supreme Court, in Sindell v. Abbott Laborato-
ries, was the first court to apply market share liability to provide
redress to plaintiffs injured by in utero exposure to the cancer-
causing drug DES.  The plaintiffs filed a class action suit against
eleven alleged manufacturers of DES, seeking redress for the par-
ticularly pernicious form of cancer (adenocarcinoma) that was
caused by DES.43
At the outset, the court catalogued the conduct of the defend-
ants that created foreseeable harm:
During the period defendants marketed DES, they knew or
should have known that it was a carcinogenic substance, that
there was a grave danger after varying periods of latency it
would cause cancerous and precancerous growths in the daugh-
ters of the mothers who took it, and that it was ineffective to
prevent miscarriage.  Nevertheless, defendants continued to ad-
vertise and market the drug as a miscarriage preventative.
They failed to test DES for efficacy and safety; the tests per-
formed by others, upon which they relied, indicated that it was
not safe or effective.  In violation of the authorization of the
Food and Drug Administration, defendants marketed DES on
40. See id.
41. See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbot Labs., 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980).
42. See id.
43. Id. at 925.
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an unlimited basis rather than as an experimental drug, and
they failed to warn of its potential danger.44
The court iterated that, generally, subjecting a defendant to
liability is predicated on the plaintiff’s showing that her injuries
were caused by that defendant; however, the court explained that
there are notable exceptions to this rule, including the Summers v.
Tice alternative liability.45  The court declined to apply any of the
exceptions. It concluded that alternative liability was inapplicable
under the circumstances because that doctrine requires that all
potential tortious actors be joined in the suit.46  The inapplicabil-
ity of the existing burden-shifting doctrines of tort law would have
left the innocent plaintiff remediless against irrefutably culpable
defendants.47
Under the circumstances, the court referenced “forceful argu-
ments in favor of holding that the plaintiff has a cause of action”:48
In our contemporary complex industrialized society, advances in
science and technology create fungible goods which may harm
44. Id. at 925-26.
45. Id.  The other exceptions that the court noted are concerted action and “enter-
prise liability.” Id. at 927-28.  Under concerted action, a defendant is subject to liabil-
ity based on his actions in connection with another (or multiple others), often in the
form of a “common scheme or plan.” PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 46,
at 291 (4th ed. 1971).  The Restatement (Second) of Torts describes three scenarios by
which a defendant may be liable for concerted action.  A defendant is subject to con-
certed action liability if he or she, “(a) does a tortious act in concert with the other or
pursuant to a common design with him, or (b) knows that the other’s conduct consti-
tutes a breach of duty and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the other
so to conduct himself, or (c) gives substantial assistance to the other in accomplishing
a tortious result and his own conduct, separately considered, constitutes a breach of
duty to the third person.”  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 (1979).
Under “enterprise liability,” defendant-manufacturers in a particular case are
subject to liability by their adherence to an industry-wide standard that perpetuates
the industry’s engaging in conduct that could cause foreseeable harm. See, e.g., Hall
v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., Inc., 345 F.Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); Sindell, 607
P.2d at 933-35. The result is that “ ‘the industrywide [sic] standard becomes itself the
cause of plaintiff’s injury, just as defendants’ joint plan is the cause of injury in the
traditional concert of action plea.  Each defendant’s adherence perpetuates this stan-
dard, which results in the manufacture of the particular, unidentifiable injury-pro-
ducing product.  Therefore, each industry member has contributed to plaintiff’s
injury.’” Sindell, 607 P.2d at 935 (quoting Naomi Sheiner, Comment, DES and a Pro-
posed Theory of Enterprise Liability, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 963, 997 (1978)).  As such,
each defendant could be liable for all injuries caused by adherence to the offending
industry standard. Sindell, 607 P.2d at 934-935.
46. Sindell, 607 P.2d at 936.
47. Id. at 925, 936.
48. Id. at 936.
13
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consumers and which cannot be traced to any specific producer.
The response of the courts can be either to adhere rigidly to
prior doctrine, denying recovery to those injured by such prod-
ucts, or to fashion remedies to meet these changing needs. Just
as Justice Traynor in his landmark concurring opinion in Escola
v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., recognized that in an era of mass pro-
duction and complex marketing methods the traditional stan-
dard of negligence was insufficient to govern the obligations of
manufacturer to consumer, so should we acknowledge that some
adaptation of the rules of causation and liability may be appro-
priate in these recurring circumstances.49
The court highlighted two additional arguments for subject-
ing the DES manufacturers to liability.  First, the court echoed
Summers in stating that “as between an innocent plaintiff and
negligent defendants, the latter should bear the cost of the in-
jury.”50  The court observed that it was not the plaintiffs’ fault
that they could not admit any evidence of causation.  While the
defendants were not at fault for the absence of evidence either,
“their conduct in marketing a drug the effects of which are
delayed for many years played a significant role in creating the
unavailability of proof.”51
Second, the court noted that the defendants were in the better
position than the plaintiffs to absorb the cost of injury resulting
from their manufacture of a defective product.52 “The manufac-
turer is in the best position to discover and guard against defects
in its products and to warn of harmful effects; thus, holding it lia-
ble for defects and failure to warn of harmful effects will provide
an incentive to product safety.”53
Accordingly, the court subjected the DES manufacturers to li-
ability and in doing so, obligated each manufacturer to cover dam-
ages approximately commensurate with its market share for the
offending product.54
In sum, the market share liability adopted by Sindell holds as
follows: If (1) the plaintiff is innocent, (2) the defendants are negli-
gent, (3) the plaintiff was injured by a fungible product, (4) the
plaintiff, through no fault on her part, cannot identify the particu-
49. 607 P.2d at 936.
50. Id. at 936.
51. Id. at 936.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. 607 P.2d at 936-37.
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lar manufacturer responsible for producing the DES pill that in-
jured her, and (5) the plaintiff has joined a sufficient number of
defendants who comprise a substantial share of the DES market,
then (6) the burden shifts to each defendant-manufacturer to ei-
ther (a) show that it could not have made the particular DES pill
that caused the plaintiff’s injury, or (b) assume liability for the
plaintiff’s damages in proportion to its market share.55
Market share liability has not enjoyed the same widespread
acceptance as the alternative liability theory or the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitor.56  Indeed, there is a significant split in courts, with
some accepting the theory57 and others rejecting it in similar fac-
tual circumstances.58
55. Id. at 935-37.
56. The doctrine has not been adopted in lead poisoning cases. See, e.g., Santiago
v. Sherwin Williams Co., 3 F.3d 546, 550-51 (1st Cir. 1993); Brenner v. American
Cyanamid Co., 263 A.D.2d 165, (N.Y. App. Div. 1999); Skipworth v. Lead Industries
Ass’n, Inc., 690 A.2d 169 (Pa. 1997); Jefferson v. Lead Industries Ass’n, Inc., 106 F.3d
1245 (5th Cir. 1997).
57. See, e.g., In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (“MTBE”) Prod. Liab. Litig., 209
F.R.D. 323 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); Ferris v. Gatke Corp., 132 Cal. Rptr. 2d 819 (1st Dist.
2003); George v. Hous. Auth. of New Orleans, 906 So. 2d 1282 (4th Cir. 2005), rehear-
ing denied, (July 22, 2005); Gassmann v. Eli Lilly and Co., 407 F. Supp. 2d 203 (D.C.
Cir. 2005); In re MTBE Prod. Liab. Litig., 517 F. Supp. 2d 662 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); In re
MTBE Prod. Liab. Litig., 447 F. Supp. 2d 289 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); Ray v. Cutter Lab. Div.
of Miles, Inc., 754 F Supp 193 (D. Fla. 1991); Conley v. Boyle Drug Co., 570 So.2d 275
(Fla. 1990); Smith v. Cutter Biological, Inc., a Div. of Miles Inc., 823 P.2d 717 (Haw.
1991); McCormack v. Abbott Labs., 617 F. Supp. 1521 (D. Mass. 1985); Hymowitz v.
Eli Lilly and Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069 (N.Y. 1989); McElhaney v. Eli Lilly & Co., 564 F.
Supp. 265 (D. S.D. 1983); Hardy v. Johns–Manville Sales Corp., 509 F. Supp. 1353
(E.D. Tex. 1981); Martin v. Abbott Labs., 689 P.2d 368 (Wash. 1984); George v.
Parke–Davis, 733 P.2d 507 (Wash. 1987); PAYTON V. ABBOTT LABS., 437 N.E.2d 171
(Mass. 1982) (dicta indicating “the view that [Massachusetts courts] might permit
recovery from those defendants shown to be negligent to the extent of their participa-
tion in the DES market, even though the plaintiffs cannot identify the particular
source of DES which their mothers ingested”). See also McCormack, 617 F. Supp. at
1525  (federal court citing Payton and predicting Massachusetts would adopt market
share: “The emergence of a market-share theory of liability in American jurispru-
dence stems from the recognition by several courts that the field of products liability
has been changed drastically with the advent of mass production of fungible goods
and complex marketing methods.”) but cf. Santiago v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 782
F.Supp. 186, 191 (D. Mass. 1992) (recognizing Payton and McCormack, but declining
to extend market share to lead pigment) aff’d, 3 F.3d 546 (1st Cir. 1993).
58. Zafft v. Eli Lilly & Co., 676 S.W.2d 241 (Mo. 1984); George v. Housing Author-
ity, 906 So.2d 1282, 1287 (La. App. 2005); Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co. 560 N.E.2d 324 (Ill.
1990); Shackil v. Lederle Labs., 561 A.2d 511 (N.J. 1989); Mulcahy v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
386 N.W.2d 67, 76 (Iowa 1986); Tidler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 851 F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(applying Maryland and D.C. law); Robertson v. Allied Signal, Inc., 914 F.2d 360, 380
(3d Cir. 1990) (applying Pennsylvania law); White v. Celotex Corp., 907 F.2d 104, 106
(9th Cir. 1990) (applying Arizona law); Blackston v. Shook & Fletcher Insulation Co.,
764 F.2d 1480, 1483 (11th Cir. 1985) (applying Georgia law); Goldman v. Johns-
15
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D. Risk Contribution Liability
In 1984, four years after the California Supreme Court de-
cided Sindell, the Wisconsin Supreme Court reviewed a similar
personal injury case brought by a plaintiff who had suffered inju-
ries stemming from her mother’s ingestion of DES while she was
pregnant with the plaintiff.59  The plaintiff urged the court to
adopt market share liability, among other doctrines of law, such
as alternative liability, to account for her inability to pinpoint
which DES manufacturer’s pill caused her injuries.60  In Collins v.
Ely Lilly & Co., the court eschewed the adoption of all theories of
liability advanced by the plaintiff in favor of its own theory, risk
contribution liability.61  Risk contribution holds that a plaintiff
may maintain a cause of action for products liability if he or she
can show that the defendant produced or marketed the type of
product that caused injury to the plaintiff.  Although the court de-
clined to adopt market share liability for Wisconsin, the court left
intact the premise upon which market share liability is based: as
between the faultless plaintiff and the culpable defendants, the
latter should bear the cost of injury.  In essence, like market share
liability, risk contribution relaxes traditional notions of product
identification in limited circumstances.
Theresa Collins filed suit against seventeen companies that
historically produced DES, alleging, among other claims, that
they were negligent in producing and marketing DES for use by
pregnant women, and that they misrepresented that DES was
safe for such use.62  The trial court dismissed Collins’ claim be-
cause she was unable to “identify the precise producer or marketer
of the DES taken by her mother due to the generic status of some
Manville Sales Corp., 514 N.E.2d 691, 700-01 (Ohio 1987); Case v. Fibreboard Corp.,
743 P.2d 1062, 1064-67 (Okla. 1987); Gaulding v. Celotex Corp., 772 S.W.2d 66, 70-71
(Tex. 1989).
59. Collins, 342 N.W.2d at 42.
60. Id. at 44-49 (indicating that the plaintiff proposed the adoption of alternative
liability, concerted action liability, enterprise liability, civil conspiracy, and market
share liability).
61. Collins, 342 N.W.2d at 48-49. The Collins court declined to adopt market
share liability because that doctrine is “limited in practical applicability.” Id. at 48.
The court thought it was too burdensome to define and prove market share, especially
given that the DES manufacturers lacked the data indicating how much each pro-
duced and marketed in a particular geographic region during a particular time. Id. at
48-49.  In addition, the court concluded that the ‘mini-trial’ necessarily devoted to
determining the defendant-manufacturers’ market share would consume an intolera-
ble amount of judicial resources. Id at 49.
62. Id. at 42.
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DES, the number of producers or marketers, the lack of pertinent
records, and the passage of time.”63
Collins could not satisfy the strictures of traditional legal cau-
sation so the court was faced with a difficult choice: it could either
allow the innocent plaintiff to “bear the cost of injury” because she
could not identify the manufacturer of the DES that injured her,
or it could require the defendants to be subject to liability “for
DES which they may not have produced or marketed.”64  In “the
interests of justice and fundamental fairness,”65 as well as in di-
rect response to the mandate of the Wisconsin Constitution,66 the
court chose the latter, fashioning the risk contribution doctrine as
a method for recovery for DES and DES-like67 products liability
cases: “[A]s between the plaintiff, who probably is not at fault, and
the defendants, who may have provided the product which caused
the injury, the interests of justice and fundamental fairness de-
mand that the latter should bear the cost of injury.”68
In the course of its opinion, the court set forth the factual
predicates a plaintiff must establish to invoke the risk contribu-
tion doctrine.  A plaintiff must show: (1) the existence of many po-
tential innocent plaintiffs;69 (2) the shared culpability in
producing or marketing what was later shown to be a harmful
product;70 (3) the inability of the innocent plaintiff to identify the
precise manufacturer of the product that caused the injury be-
cause of the generic or fungible nature of the product, the large
number of manufacturers, the passage of time, and the loss of
records;71 and, (4) due to the traditional strictures of legal causa-
tion, the inability of the innocent plaintiff to recover from poten-
tially negligent manufactures.72
63. Id. at 43.
64. Id. at 49.
65. Id.
66. Collins, 342 N.W.2d at 45. The court cited Article I, section 9 of the Wisconsin
Constitution as a basis for establishing the risk contribution doctrine. That section
provides in relevant part: “Every person is entitled to a certain remedy in the laws for
all injuries or wrongs which he may receive in his person, property or character . . . .”
Wis. Const., art. I, § 9.
67. Collins, 342 N.W.2d at 49. The court stated that the risk contribution doctrine
“could apply in situations which are factually similar to the DES cases.” Id.
68. Collins, 342 N.W.2d  at 49.
69. Id. at 44.
70. Id. at 49.
71. Id. at 44.
72. Id. at 43, 44.
17
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The court supported its decision to adopt risk contribution lia-
bility on a range of grounds.  First, each defendant either sought
government approval of DES or participated in the manufacturing
or marketing of the drug.73  Accordingly, the court reasoned, each
defendant tortiously contributed to the risk of harm to the public,
generally, and Collins, specifically, and therefore shared some
measure of culpability.74  Second, the court observed that, as be-
tween the injured plaintiff and a culpable drug company defen-
dant, the defendant is “in a better position to absorb the cost of the
injury.”75  Consequently, the court concluded that it is better for
drug companies and consumers to share the cost of injury than
place that cost solely on the shoulders of an innocent plaintiff.76
Finally, the court determined that subjecting drug companies to
liability in this context would provide incentive for them to “test
adequately the drugs they place on the market for general medical
use.”77
After setting forth its rationale for establishing the risk con-
tribution doctrine, the Collins court proceeded to identify the ele-
ments the plaintiff must prove to establish liability under that
doctrine: (1) Collins’ mother took DES; (2) DES caused Collin’s in-
juries; (3) the defendant produced or marketed the type of DES
taken by Collins’ mother;78 (4) the defendant’s conduct “in produc-
73. Collins, 342 N.W.2d  at 49.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 49.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Collins, 342 N.W.2d at 50. The Collins court stated that a plaintiff need com-
mence suit against only one defendant, rather than against all potentially liable
defendants:
Practical considerations favor permitting the plaintiff to proceed, at least
initially, against one defendant.  One alternative would be to require the
plaintiff to join as defendants “a substantial share” of the producers and
marketers of DES.  We conclude that this is unworkable because of the
problems we noted earlier inherent in trying to establish the relevant
market and each defendant’s share of the market.  Another alternative
would be to require the defendant to join a “reasonable number” of possi-
bly liable defendants.  We cannot, however, define what that “reasonable
number” would be because there are so many potentially liable drug com-
panies.  Moreover, either alternative would waste judicial resources by
requiring an initial determination of whether the plaintiff has joined a
sufficient number of defendants.  We also conclude that the defendant is
[in] a better position than the plaintiff to determine which other drug
companies may share liability.  We recognize that many drug companies
do not have relevant records, but they, as participants in the DES mar-
ket, presumably have more information or potential access to relevant
information than does the plaintiff.
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol26/iss1/5
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ing or marketing the DES constituted a breach of a legally recog-
nized duty to [Collins].”79  The court quickly emphasized that
Collins was not obligated to prove that a “defendant produced or
marketed the precise DES” taken by her mother.80  Instead, she
was required to establish only that “a defendant produced or mar-
keted the type (e.g., color, shape, markings, size, or other identifi-
able characteristics) of DES” taken by her mother.81
Res ipsa, alternative liability, market share liability, and risk
contribution liability are all welcome evolutions in the common
law.  They embody the widely-accepted and long-standing notion
that the law should not leave an innocent plaintiff remediless
against an indisputably tortious defendant.
II. THOMAS V. MALLETT: NEGLIGENCE IN THE
PAINT – THE FIRST EXTENSION OF RISK
CONTRIBUTION LIABILITY BEYOND DES
In 2005, the Wisconsin Supreme Court issued the ground-
breaking decision of Thomas v. Mallett, declaring that the former
manufacturers of lead pigment are not immune from personal in-
jury lawsuits brought by lead-poisoned children, and that they are
subject to liability under the risk contribution doctrine.82  The
court emphasized three primary justifications for applying risk
contribution to lead pigment cases: (1) the egregiously culpable
conduct of the lead pigment industry in creating the risk of harm
that led to the ensuing childhood lead poisoning crisis in Wiscon-
sin;83 (2) the fundamental state constitutional guarantee that
“[e]very person is entitled to a certain remedy in the law for all
injuries or wrongs which he may receive in his person . . . .”;84 as
well as, (3) the applicability of the “main policy reasons” identified
in Collins that warranted the creation of the risk-contribution doc-
trine in the first place.85  We examine each of these justifications
more closely.
Id.
79. Collins, 342 N.W.2d at 50.
80. Id.
81. Id. (emphasis added).
82. Thomas ex rel. Gramling v. Mallett, 701 N.W.2d 523 (Wis. 2005).
83. Id. at 557.
84. Id. at 551 (citing Wis. Const., art. I, § 9).
85. Id.
19
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A. The Lead Pigment Industry: A Century of Culpable
Conduct
The summary judgment record before the Thomas court im-
plicated such an egregious degree of tortious conduct on the part
of the manufacturers of white lead carbonate that the Wisconsin
Supreme Court, in part, justified the extension of the risk contri-
bution on the basis of the public policy in favor of deterring know-
ingly wrongful conduct.86  The Thomas court specifically noted
that Sherwin Williams appreciated the dangers of residential lead
paint even before it started manufacturing white lead carbonate
as a pigment for residential use:87
In July 1904, in its monthly publication The S.W.P., Sherwin-
Williams publicized the hazards of white lead paint. Under the
bold headline, “DANGERS OF WHITE LEAD,” Sherwin-Wil-
liams reported that a committee in France had been appointed
to investigate the use of white lead and other lead mixtures for
painting houses. Sherwin-Williams noted that one of the com-
mittee’s experts indicated that lead paints were “poisonous in a
large degree, both for the workmen and for the inhabitants of a
house painted with lead colors.” Sherwin-Williams also noted
that the expert was of the opinion “that the absolute disuse of
white lead has become an imperative necessity.” Nevertheless,
six years later, in 1910, Sherwin-Williams began manufacturing
white lead carbonate after it acquired a white lead processing
plant. Moreover, in 1917, during the First World War, Sherwin-
Williams advised the War Department that government specifi-
cations for 50 percent white lead carbonate paint for war hel-
mets should be replaced with its lead-free lithopone pigment.
86. Id. at 558 n.44.  Indeed, the Thomas court noted that the public policy in Col-
lins in favor of providing an incentive to drug companies to test adequately a product
before placing it on the market was not implicated in the context of white lead carbon-
ate because leaded pigments in residential paints had been banned over twenty-five
years earlier. Id.  The Thomas court further noted that it presented a detailed review
of the historical conduct of the pigment manufacturers to illuminate the magnitude of
the risk of injury created by the pigment manufacturers. Id. at 533 n.11.
87. The Thomas court exhaustively reviewed the culpable historical conduct of
other white lead carbonate manufacturers as well as their trade associations, includ-
ing Anaconda Lead Products Company and International Smelting (Atlantic Richfield
Co. sued as successor in interest), Glidden (SCM and Millennium Holdings LLC sued
as successor), W.P. Fuller (ConAgra sued as successor), National Lead Company (cur-
rently known as NL Industries), E.I. DuPont de Nemours, and American Cyanamid.
However, for purposes of illustrating the egregious nature of the culpable conduct
involved in the process of creating the risk of harm resulting in the public health
catastrophe of widespread childhood lead poisoning, this Article will focus on the con-
duct of the Sherwin Williams Company as described by the Thomas court.
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Sherwin-Williams stated that the advantage of switching to its
lithopone pigment was that the danger from lead poisoning was
entirely eliminated.88
In contrast, the Thomas court observed that in 1909 France
and Austria had banned or severely limited the use of white lead
carbonate as a pigment in residential paints.89  The League of Na-
tions held a conference in Geneva in 1921, attended by 400 dele-
gates from 40 nations, after which many nations acted to limit the
residential use of white lead carbonate, including Belgium, Tuni-
sia, Greece, Czechoslovakia, Great Britain, Hungary, Sweden, Po-
land, Spain, Yugoslavia, and Cuba.90  The lead pigment
manufacturers perceived the conference and the recommended
limitations on using white lead carbonate for residential paints as
a sinister plot by organized labor.91
Physicians employed by Sherwin Williams and other pigment
manufacturers attended a confidential conference in Chicago in
1937 which was sponsored by their trade association, the Lead In-
dustries Association (LIA). The particular vulnerability of chil-
dren to lead poisoning was discussed at the conference.92
Wisconsin’s highest court took particular umbrage at the culpable
mindset exhibited by the pigment industry, noting that:
At this confidential conference, there was discussion on how to
defeat workers’ compensation claims by clearing the blood of
lead poisoning evidence. Some suggestions included injecting
the worker with liver in order to “bring him up” even though “it
doesn’t do him any good.”93
In 1939, the National Paint Varnish and Lacquer Association
(NPVLA) confidentially warned its members, including Sherwin
Williams, that it was vital to safe-guard the public with adequate
warnings concerning toxic pigments such as white lead carbonate:
1. A manufacturer who puts out a dangerous article or sub-
stance without accompanying it with a warning as to its danger-
ous properties is ordinarily liable for any damage which results
from such failure to warn.
88. 701 N.W.2d at 537.
89. Id. at 537 n.19.
90. Id. at 537 n.21.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 542.
93. Id. at 542 n.25.
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. . . .
9. The manufacturer . . . must know the qualities of his product
and cannot escape liability on the ground that he did not know it
to be dangerous.
10. The general rule that a manufacturer is not liable to those
not in privity of contract with him does not apply when his prod-
uct is imminently or inherently dangerous.94
At the same time that Sherwin Williams manufactured and
promoted white lead carbonate pigments for residential use, it
also manufactured safer and more cheaply produced alternatives
including zinc based paints and lithopone.95 By 1942, the National
Safety Council came to the conclusion that “the most obvious
method of preventing lead poisoning is to substitute for lead and
its compounds other materials that are non-toxic.”96  As of Decem-
ber of 1945, despite advisories from the U.S. Children’s Bureau,
the LIA and its members continued to promote lead paint for inte-
rior residential use, and Sherwin Williams as of that point in time
went so far as to actually promote lead paint for use on toys.97
Sherwin Williams ceased manufacturing white lead carbonate in
1947, but continued to sell interior residential paints with white
lead carbonate manufactured by the National Lead Company as
late as the 1950’s.98
No reasonable person could deny that hundreds of thousands
of children were poisoned by white lead carbonate produced by
each of the leaded pigment manufacturers, including Sherwin
Williams.  The massive scale of each manufacturer’s contribution
to the public health catastrophe of childhood lead poisoning, is evi-
denced by the fact that as of 1995, it was estimated that 675,000
children suffered from the devastating consequences of lead
poisoning.99 Given the latent nature of those injuries, the passage
of time, and the generic/fungible nature of the pigment, few, if
any, of those children are able to prove that Sherwin Williams was
the manufacturer of the pigment they actually ingested. Never-
theless, many of those children have suffered life crippling inju-
94. Id. at 538.  Other members of the NPVLA included the National Lead Com-
pany (currently known as NL Industries), Glidden, (named in Thomas as SCM Chem-
icals), and W.P. Fuller (named in Thomas as Con Agra).
95. Id. at 538 n.22.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 543, 546.
98. Id. at 546.
99. Peace ex rel. Lerner v. Nw. Nat’l Ins. Co., 596 N.W.2d 429, 446-47 (Wis. 1999).
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ries.  Many more children will be poisoned in the future as a direct
result of Sherwin Williams’ substantial contribution to the crea-
tion of the risk of lead poisoning.  Unfortunately, absent wide-
spread modification of the common law, this is a legacy that is
poised to continue unabated everywhere except in Wisconsin.
B. Childhood Lead Poisoning: The Resultant Public
Health Catastrophe
Six years before Thomas, in Peace v. Northwestern National
Insurance Co., the Wisconsin Supreme Court noted that lead from
residential paint is an extreme neurotoxin and that “even a single
atom of lead, once in the human body, binds to a protein and in-
duces some damage; the greater the exposure, the more serious
the effects.”100  The Peace court emphasized that the consequences
of exposure can be disastrous for children:
At high blood levels . . . lead may cause encephalopathy and
death.  Survivors of encephalopathy may have lifelong severe
disabilities, such as seizures and mental retardation.  Lead tox-
icity affects almost every organ system, most importantly, the
central and peripheral nervous systems, kidneys, and blood. . . .
Lead interferes with enzymes that catalyze the formation of
heme.  It also inhibits both prenatal and postnatal growth.
Lead impairs hearing acuity.  Lead is a carcinogen in laboratory
animals, and there is some evidence for carcinogenicity in work-
ers exposed to lead but not in children.
Although the impairment of cognition in young children . . . has
been reported, no threshold has been identified. . . . The rela-
tionship between lead levels and IQ deficits was found to be re-
markably consistent.  A number of studies have found that for
every 10 ug/dL increase in blood lead levels, there was a lower-
ing of mean IQ in children by four to seven points.101
The Peace court expressed an urgent concern that the devas-
tating scope of the problem had reached epidemic proportions:
Six hundred seventy-five thousand American children are esti-
mated to have blood lead levels indicating lead toxicity. Four to
five million more have blood lead levels associated with im-
100. Id. at  438 n.14  (citing Sergio Piomelli, Childhood Lead Poisoning in the ‘90’s,
93 PEDIATRICS 508 (Mar. 1994); Michael W. Sannon & John W. Graef, Lead Intoxica-
tion in Infancy, 89 PEDIATRICS 87 (Jan. 1992)).
101. Id. at 437 (quoting George A. Gellert et al., Lead Poisoning: From Screening to
Primary Prevention, 92 PEDIATRICS 176, 177 (July 1993)).
23
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paired neurological and intellectual functions. The two most im-
portant sources of exposure among children are lead-based
paint and household dust.102
Citing the most authoritative medical authority on the sub-
ject, the Thomas court elaborated on the tender vulnerability of
children to lead poisoning:
According to the Center for Disease Control’s (“CDC’s”) Prevent-
ing Lead Poisoning in Young Children, it is well-recognized that
given children’s rapidly developing nervous systems, “[c]hildren
are particularly susceptible to lead’s toxic effects.” Because the
human body cannot differentiate between lead and calcium, af-
ter lead has remained in the bloodstream for a few weeks, it is
then absorbed into bones, where it can collect for a lifetime.
Once lead enters the child’s system, more lead is absorbed than
would be in adults.
Children “are more exposed to lead than older groups because
their normal hand-to-mouth activities may introduce many non-
food items into their gastrointestinal tract.”  The CDC noted
that “[p]ica, the repeated ingestion of nonfood substances, has
been implicated in cases of lead poisoning; however, a child does
not have to eat paint chips to become poisoned.”  It is more com-
mon for children to ingest dust and soil contaminated with lead
from paint that either has flaked or chalked as it aged or has
been otherwise disturbed during home maintenance or renova-
tion. “This lead-contaminated house dust, ingested via normal
repetitive hand-to-mouth activity, is now recognized as a major
contributor to the total body burden of lead in children.” Thus,
“[b]ecause of the critical role of dust as an exposure pathway,
children  living in sub-standard housing and in homes undergo-
ing renovation are at particular risk for lead poisoning.”103
The emerging scientific literature provides further cause for
alarm.  For example, as reported in the current  policy statement
of the American Academy of Pediatrics, recent studies confirm a
link between early childhood lead exposure and delinquent behav-
ior during adolescence and new data demonstrates inverse as-
102. Id. at 446-447 (citing Martha R. Mahoney, Four Million Children at Risk:
Lead Paint Poisoning Victims and the Law, 9 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 46-47 (1990)). The
Peace court also indicated that the scope and gravity of lead poisoning prompted the
United States Department of Health and Human Services to say in 1991 that child-
hood lead poisoning was “the most important environmental health problem for young
children.” Id. (citing 92 PEDIATRICS 176 (1993)).
103. Thomas, 701 N.W.2d at 533 (internal citations omitted).
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sociations between blood lead concentrations below 10 mg/dL and
IQ.104
Medical authorities agree that the single most significant
cause of childhood lead poisoning is lead from residential paint.105
In Wisconsin, state authorities report that as of 2005 there were
765,978 homes with lead-based hazards.106  It is estimated that
one in six, or 120,000 of these toxic homes, were occupied by chil-
dren under six years of age.107 Given the levels of publicly funded
programs available in Wisconsin, about 1,500 of these homes may
be rendered lead safe for children per year.108  Accordingly, Wis-
consin public health authorities estimate that it will take many
decades to eliminate significant existing lead hazards from homes
currently occupied by vulnerable potential victims.109
The Thomas court noted that approximately 3 million tons of
lead remain in an estimated 57 million homes nationwide and 3.8
million of those homes contain both lead hazards and vulnerable
children.110  Researchers estimate that American housing con-
tains 7.5 billion square feet of interior surfaces covered with lead
paint and 29.2 billion square feet of exterior surfaces covered with
lead paint.111  The average home with lead paint contains 259
square feet of interior lead paint and 996 square feet of exterior
lead paint.112  In fully one-third of all homes containing lead paint
104. American Academy of Pediatrics, Lead Exposure in Children: Prevention, De-
tection, and Management, 116 PEDIATRICS 2 (2005) (citing David E. Jacobs et al., The
Prevalence of Lead-Based Paint Hazards in U.S. Housing, 110 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP.
A599-A606 (2002); Kim N. Dietrich et al., Early Exposure to Lead and Juvenile Delin-
quency, 23 NEUROTOXICOLOGY AND JUVENILE DELINQUENCY 511-18 (2001); Herbert L.
Needleman et al., Bone lead levels in Adjudicated Delinquents, A Case Control Study,
24 NEUROTOXICOL TERATOL 711-17 (2002); Richard L. Canfield et al., Intellectual Im-
pairment In Children With Blood Lead Concentrations Below 10 mG Per Deciliter, 348
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1517-26 (2003); Letter to the Editor, David C. Bellinger & Herbert
L. Needleman, Intellectual Impairment and Blood Lead Levels, 349 NEW ENG. J. MED.
500 (2003)).
105. American Academy of Pediatrics, supra note 104. See also Thomas, 701
N.W.2d at 534.
106. Dep’t of Health & Family Services, Division of Public Health, Report to the
Governor and the Legislature, STATE EFFORTS TO END CHILDHOOD LEAD POISONING:
EVALUATION OF ACT 113, p.3 (Apr. 13, 2005).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Thomas, 701 N.W.2d at 534.
111. David E. Jacobs et al., The Prevalence of Lead-Based Paint Hazards in U.S.
Housing, 110 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 599, 603 (2002). Calculated in terms of square
miles, this data indicates that there are a total of 1316.4 square miles of lead painted
surfaces covering homes nationwide.
112. Id.
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that is not deteriorated, impact and friction surfaces nevertheless
produce hazardous levels of lead contaminated dust.113  The
Thomas court echoed this concern noting that lead painted win-
dows generate lead dust through normal open and closing even if
the paint is otherwise intact.114  Thus, the dangers of lead poison-
ing from lead paint exist even when the paint is not deteriorated
or otherwise might be considered to be in a “lead-safe status.”115
The culpable conduct of the white lead carbonate manufactur-
ers created a truly monstrous risk of severe and devastating harm
for children.  Against this backdrop, the Thomas court tersely re-
sponded to the arguments that since any given child could have
been poisoned at any time between 1900 and 1978, risk contribu-
tion should not be extended to white lead carbonate:
[T]he Pigment Manufacturers’ argument must be put into per-
spective: they are essentially arguing that their negligent con-
duct should be excused because they got away with it for too
long. As Thomas says, the Pigment Manufacturers “are arguing
that they should not be held liable under the risk contribution
doctrine because of the magnitude of their wrongful conduct.”116
C. The Wisconsin State Constitutional Guarantee to a
Remedy for Every Injury or Wrong
In opposing the extension of the risk contribution doctrine,
the pigment manufacturers argued that white lead carbonate was
not factually similar to DES because lead poisoning victims had
available remedies against the landlords of the premises at which
they were poisoned.117  The pigment manufacturers reasoned that
in Collins, the common law was modified in order to provide a
remedy to an otherwise remediless victim.118  Therefore, since
Steven Thomas had a remedy against his landlords for his lead
poisoning, the Wisconsin constitutional guarantee of a remedy
was not implicated.119
Citing Article I, section 9 of the Wisconsin Constitution, the
Thomas court disagreed.  That provision in the constitution
states:
113. Id.
114. 701 N.W.2d at 534.
115. Id. at 552.
116. Id. at 562.
117. Id. at 551-552.
118. Id.
119. 701 N.W.2d at 551.
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Every person is entitled to a certain remedy in the laws for all
injuries, or wrongs which he may receive in his person, prop-
erty, or character; he ought to obtain justice freely, and without
being obliged to purchase it, completely and without denial,
promptly and without delay, conformably to the laws.
The Thomas court held that Article I, section 9, is not “so
frail” as the pigment manufacturers characterized it.  In doing so,
the court clarified that the Collins court was “concerned with more
than just ensuring that a plaintiff had a remedy against someone
for something”; rather it was concerned with “fashioning an ade-
quate remedy when one did not exist.”120 The court expressed “se-
rious concerns” over the attempt of the pigment manufacturers to
“displace all of the blame for lead poisoning from its white lead
carbonate pigment on landlords and the effect that will have on
the adequacy of a plaintiff’s remedy.”121 Even though the individ-
ual plaintiff in Thomas had recovered from his landlords, future
plaintiffs might not be so lucky because of the scant availability of
premises insurance for lead poisoning injuries.122
The Thomas court embraced the concurrence below:
The plain meaning of this section is that every person is entitled
to a certain remedy for “all injuries or wrongs which he may
receive in his person.” Notice that the wording is in the disjunc-
tive. The way I read this clause, it means that even assuming
only one injury, if that injury was brought about by separate
wrongs against the person, that person is entitled to a remedy
for each wrong.
I have never seen a case that insulates a wrongdoer from being
exposed to a lawsuit just because there exists a remedy against
another wrongdoer.123
Furthermore, the Thomas court injected new vitality into Ar-
ticle I, section 9, noting that the right to a remedy is a “substan-
tive right” entitling a litigant to a remedy as it exists in the
common law and while the legislature may change the common
law, such changes must be reasonable:
120. Id. at 552 (emphasis in original).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 552-53; See also Peace, 596 N.W.2d at 439, 449.
123. 701 N.W.2d at 554 (quoting Thomas ex rel. Gramling v. Mallett, 685 N.W.2d
791 (Wis. Ct. App. 2004), rev’d in part, aff’d in part, 701 N.W.2d 523 (Wis. 2005)).
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If the legislature can take away the remedy to [an] unjustifiable
and alarming extent, [the legislature] can destroy it entirely,
and thus this solemn constitutional declaration of the people be-
comes a dead letter, a mere ‘glittering generality’ without sub-
stance or effect.124
Thus, the Thomas court rejected the notion that the availabil-
ity of remedies against other independent tortfeasors somehow
satisfies the constitutional promise of an adequate and certain
remedy for all injuries or wrongs.
D. White Lead Carbonate is Factually Similar to DES in
All the Ways Relevant to the Public Policies That
Justify the Risk Contribution Doctrine
The Collins court held that the risk contribution doctrine
could be extended to other situations which are factually similar
to the DES cases.125 The Thomas court recognized that Steven
Thomas, like the plaintiff in Collins, could not identify a precise
manufacturer of the white lead carbonate he ingested because of
the number of potential manufacturers, the passage of time, and
the loss of records.126  Thus, the key factual criteria upon which
the Collins court relied to create the risk contribution doctrine
were also the criteria that the Thomas court relied upon to deter-
mine that white lead carbonate cases are sufficiently similar to
warrant extension of the doctrine.
Nevertheless, the pigment manufacturers argued that there
existed a number of other significant factual differences between
DES and white lead carbonate that should have precluded exten-
sion of the risk contribution doctrine.  The Thomas court appropri-
ately rejected these alleged differences as immaterial.
First, the pigment manufacturers argued that white lead car-
bonate was not fungible in that it was not manufactured from a
chemically identical formula.127 In Collins, all DES was chemi-
cally identical, whereas in Thomas, the offending white lead car-
bonate could have been made according to one of three slightly
different chemical formulas.128  However, fungibility is material to
the risk contribution analysis only in so far as it relates to the
124. Id. at 555, n.37 (quoting Phelps v. Rooney, 9 Wis. 55, 82 (1859) (Dixon, C.J.,
dissenting)).
125. Collins, 342 N.W.2d at 50.
126. Thomas, 701 N.W.2d at 559.
127. Id.
128. Id.
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question of product interchangeability due to its generic status.129
The degree of the product’s fungibility relates directly to the plain-
tiff’s ability to identify with precision the manufacturer of the
product that actually injured him or her.  Accordingly, the
Thomas court focused on three dimensions of fungibility: whether
it is functionally interchangeable, whether it is physically indis-
tinguishable, and whether it presents some degree of uniform
risk.130
The Thomas court determined that it was undisputed that
white lead carbonate pigments were in fact functionally inter-
changeable and physically indistinguishable as it pertained to the
key issue of product identifiability.  With regard to uniformity of
risk, the Thomas court found that all “white lead carbonates were
produced utilizing ‘virtually identical chemical formulas’ such
that all white lead carbonates were identically defective.”131  What
emerged from the Thomas decision is a practical definition of fun-
gibility that functionally and realistically takes into account the
product identification criteria that justified the creation of risk
contribution in the first place.  To have required identical chemi-
cal formulas would have constituted the triumph of form over
substance.
Second, the pigment manufacturers argued that DES cases
presented a nine-month window of opportunity for exculpation
under the risk contribution doctrine, while white lead carbonate
cases involved exculpation periods of up to 78 years.132 However,
depending on the date of construction, in lead pigment cases, the
relevant exculpation period will not always be as long.133  For ex-
ample, if the home containing white lead carbonate was con-
129. Id.
130. Id. at 560-61.
131. Thomas, 701 N.W.2d at 561.
132. Id. at 562.
The Pigment Manufacturers note that the paint Thomas allegedly in-
gested could have been applied at any time between construction of the
two houses in 1900 and 1905 and the ban on lead paint in 1978. This
significant time span greatly exceeds the nine-month window during
which a plaintiff’s mother would have taken DES, the Pigment Manufac-
turers note. Given that Collins attempted to strike a balance between as-
suring a DES plaintiff had a remedy and providing a realistic opportunity
to each DES pill manufacturer to prove that it could not have caused the
plaintiff’s harm (by establishing its DES could not have reached the
mother during her pregnancy), the Pigment Manufacturers contend that
Collins should not be extended given that they have no reasonable ability
to exculpate themselves. Id.
133. Id. at 562-63.
29
\\server05\productn\P\PER\26-1\PER105.txt unknown Seq: 30  2-MAR-09 8:41
208 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26
structed in 1950, those manufacturers which ceased production
prior to that date would presumably be able to exculpate them-
selves. The fact that in some cases the white lead carbonate could
have been produced at anytime between 1900 and 1978, is simply
reflective of the duration of the pigment manufacturers’ wrongful
conduct, and is not a reason to excuse it.134
Third, the pigment manufacturers argued that white lead car-
bonate was factually different than DES because a child’s lead
poisoning could have been caused by many different sources of
lead while adenocarcinoma of the vagina can be caused only by
pharmaceutical use of DES by a pregnant mother.  The pigment
manufacturers also argued that lead poisoning causes many dif-
ferent injuries and therefore does not cause a “signature injury,”
in contrast to DES.135 The Thomas court dismissed these differ-
ences as irrelevant to the criteria justifying the application of the
risk contribution doctrine because “harm is harm, whether it be
‘signature’ or otherwise.”136  The logic is compelling.  The risk con-
tribution doctrine does not serve any public policy underlying its
creation by courts’ limiting its application to only those cases in
which the injury is unique to the offending product.  Furthermore,
the risk contribution doctrine relaxes causation only with regard
to product identification.  The lead poisoning plaintiff retains the
burden of proving that white lead carbonate caused his or her in-
juries.137 Thus, under the risk contribution doctrine, the burden of
proof for the lead poisoning plaintiff is more difficult than it is for
the DES plaintiff.
In addition, the pigment manufacturers overstate the argu-
ment that DES-induced injuries could come only from the phar-
maceutical use of the product by pregnant mothers.  Just as there
are some minor environmental sources of lead other than lead
paint, such as water, so too there were alternative sources of DES.
In 1979, five years before Collins was decided, the Food and Drug
Administration banned DES as a growth promotant for livestock
after determining that substantial scientific evidence established
that its widespread use left potentially carcinogenic residues in
edible portions of meat consumed by humans.138 The practice of
134. Id.
135. Thomas, 701 N.W.2d at 563.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. United States v. 2,116 Boxes of Boned Beef, 726 F.2d 1481, 1484 (10th Cir.
1984). See also Diethylstilbestrol; Withdrawal of Approval of New Animal Drug Appli-
cations; Commissioner’s Decision, 44 Fed. Reg. 54852 (Sept. 21, 1979).
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using DES for livestock feed had been widespread since the 1954
and the FDA first attempted unsuccessfully to ban the practice in
1973.139  At the time that Collins was decided, it was well known
that various consumer meats had presented an alternative source
of DES ingestion for almost thirty years, as evidenced by the
FDA’s public record and numerous published decisions.  The final
order of the FDA banning DES from livestock feed was specifically
concerned with human ingestion and, in particular, cited concerns
about the development of adenocarcinoma in the daughters of
DES treated mothers.140
Finally, the pigment manufacturers argued that white lead
carbonate was factually different than DES because, as pigment
manufacturers, they were not in exclusive control of the risk of
injury that their product created.  The Thomas court pointedly
disagreed for two reasons:
First, as doctors were the ones who prescribed the dosage of
DES, so too were the paint manufacturers that mixed the
amount of white lead carbonate in the paint. However, the paint
did not alter the toxicity of the white lead carbonate anymore
than the pharmacist did by filling a prescription. To the con-
trary, at best, the paint manufacturers actually diluted the
white lead carbonate’s toxicity. In other words, the inherent dan-
gerousness of the white lead carbonate pigment existed the mo-
ment the Pigment Manufacturers created it.
Second, the record is replete with evidence that shows the Pig-
ment Manufacturers actually magnified the risk through their
aggressive promotion of white lead carbonate, even despite the
awareness of the toxicity of lead. In either case, whoever had “ex-
clusive” control over the white lead carbonate is immaterial.141
The salient facts in Collins that justified the creation of the
risk contribution doctrine were (1) culpable manufacturer conduct
in creating the widespread risk of harm to innocent victims, (2)
the inability of the innocent victims to identify the precise manu-
facturer because of the generic/fungible nature of the product, (3)
the number of potential manufacturers, (4) the passage of time,
139. Hess & Clark v. FDA, 495 F.2d 975, 978-79 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Chemetron v. US
Dep’t of Health, Education & Welfare, 495 F.2d 995 (D.C. Cir. 1974). It should be
noted that the plaintiff in Collins was exposed to DES in utero in 1957, well after DES
was in widespread use as feed supplement for livestock. Collins, 116 Wis. 2d at 174.
140. See Diethylstilbestrol; Withdrawal of New Animal Drug Applications; Com-
missioner’s Decision, 44 Fed. Reg. 54879 (Sept. 21, 1979).
141. Thomas, 701 N.W.2d at 562-64 (emphasis added).
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and (5) the loss of records.  Each of those salient facts is present in
the context of childhood lead poisoning caused by white lead car-
bonate, except that the degree of culpability of the pigment manu-
facturers was far more egregious than that of the DES
manufacturers.
III. THE COUNTERARGUMENTS AGAINST THOSE
CRITICAL OF EXTENDING RISK
CONTRIBUTION TO LEAD LITIGATION: A
REBUTTAL TO GRAY & FAULK, AND TO
THE THOMAS DISSENTERS
John Gray and Richard Faulk, our fellow contributors to this
journal on the topic of extending market share, risk contribution,
and similar theories of liability to lead paint litigation, summon
numerous arguments against applying those theories to lead liti-
gation.  We respectfully submit, however, that their arguments
are specious. This section is devoted to exposing the weaknesses
in their premises, arguments, and conclusions.
In the decades following the Collins decision, numerous com-
mentators have opined on the wisdom and practicality of using
alternative theories of liability to hold an industry responsible for
the harms it caused.  As critics of the application of risk contribu-
tion to lead pigment cases have pointed out, there exist notable
distinctions between, on the one hand, res ipsa, alternative liabil-
ity, and market share liability, and, on the other hand, risk contri-
bution liability.142  Perhaps most significantly are the distinctions
arising from (1) the “instrumentality” causing the injury, and (2)
the source of that “instrumentality.”143 A close inspection of these
142. See, e.g., Gray & Faulk, supra note 10, at 169-88.
143. Risk contribution may be distinguished from the other doctrines on two pri-
mary grounds.  The doctrines of res ipsa, alternative liability, and market share liabil-
ity as applied in DES cases lend themselves to quick identification of both the injury-
causing “instrumentality” and its source.  For instance, res ipsa requires either that
the defendant retain some control of the instrumentality causing injury, or that the
plaintiff use an instrumentality the defendant has manufactured or maintained. See,
e.g., Giles, 636 A.2d 1335 (Conn. 1994); Smith, 560 N.E.2d 324, 339 (Ill. 1990). This
element of res ipsa necessarily requires identification of the injury-producing instru-
mentality (e.g., a falling barrel), and the negligent defendant.  Next, because alterna-
tive liability is invoked when multiple actors simultaneously engage in the similar
conduct that creates the same risk of harm, and when each of them is joined in the
suit, a plaintiff seeking application of that doctrine must identify what injured him
(e.g., buck shot) and who breached the duty of care toward him that resulted in his
injury (e.g., two hunting partners).  Finally, when applied in the DES context, market
share and risk contribution liability aide plaintiffs in tracing their injuries to a partic-
ular instrumentality, and thereby to its source, because DES is a fungible product
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distinctions, however, reveals that they prove to be nullities.  As
we discuss more specifically in subpart A below, contrary to Gray
and Faulk’s protestations, those distinctions do not militate
against the application of risk contribution in lead pigment cases.
We rebut Gray and Faulk’s criticisms on four grounds.  First,
any applicability of the distinctions in lead pigment cases actually
favors a defendant pigment manufacturer in a case brought under
the risk contribution doctrine.
Second, despite their alternate legal requirements, res ipsa,
alternative liability, and market share liability all share the same
aim: each derives from the long-standing, widely-accepted policy
that holds that, as between an innocent plaintiff who cannot iden-
tify the injury-causing tortfeasor from among multiple tortfeasors,
it is better to require the tortfeasors to extricate themselves from
liability than to insulate all of them from liability.144
Third, their criticism overlooks the legal tenet that the com-
mon law is flexible and changeable.  Courts have long recognized
that the common law must remain flexible to address the natural
evolutions society undergoes.
Finally, the factual arguments Gray and Faulk present are
rebuttable.
A. Distinctions Inherent in the Risk Contribution
Doctrine Benefit Defendants in Lead-Poisoning
Lawsuits
In lead pigment cases, neither the instrumentality nor the
source of the instrumentality is readily apparent.  With respect to
the instrumentality, it is not assured that the injures alleged re-
sult from exposure to lead pigment.  The injury alleged is often
cognitive impairment, but, as Gray and Faulk point out, cognitive
impairment may stem from myriad sources other than lead.  In
addition, with respect to the source of the instrumentality (if the
that produces a singular, or “signature,” injury – adinocarcinoma.  Thus, the pool of
potential injury-causing instrumentalities is necessarily reduced to DES, and the pool
of potential tortfeasors is necessarily reduced to DES manufacturers.
144. Richard M. Russell, Note, The Causation Requirement: Guardian of Fairness
or Obstacle to Justice? – Making Sense of a Decade of DES Litigation, 25 SUFFOLK L.
REV. 1071, 1102 (1991); Nancy Lee Firak, The Developing Policy Characteristics of
Cause-In-Fact: Alternative Forms of Liability, Epidemiological Proof and Trans-Sci-
entific Issues, 63 TEMPLE L. REV. 311 (1990); Nancy Lee Firak, Alternative Forms of
Liability: Developing Policy Aspects of the Cause-In-Fact Requirements of Tort Law,
20 AZ. ST. L. J. 1041 (1988); Stephen A. Spitz, From Res Ipsa Loquitur to Diethylstil-
bestrol: the Unidentifiable Tortfeasor in California, 65 IND. L. J. 591 (1990).
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instrumentality is determined to be lead), it is not assured that
the lead exposure came from exposure to lead pigment; exposure
to lead can occur through, food, water, or costume jewelry, for ex-
ample, although the possibility of a child’s contracting lead poison-
ing through these other sources, as opposed to lead pigment, is
remote.
To the extent that the instrumentality (whether it be lead, as
plaintiffs contend, or “confounders,” as defendants contend), and
its source (whether it be lead pigment, or other sources) are con-
tested in lead litigation, those disputes benefit the defendants.
When the injury-causing instrument, as well as the source of the
instrument, may be one of numerous possibilities, the plaintiff
bears a much greater burden of persuasion than he or she would
otherwise bear if the instrument and the source were readily ap-
parent.  For instance, in Sindell, it was undisputed that the cause
of the plaintiffs’ injuries was DES.  Consequently, the plaintiffs
were absolved of admitting proof on that question. In contrast, in
lead litigation, it is invariably disputed whether lead caused the
plaintiff’s injuries.  Accordingly, a plaintiff must admit proof on
that question. Furthermore, in lead litigation it is also invariably
disputed whether the plaintiff was lead poisoned from exposure to
lead paint or from exposure to some other source of lead.  As a
result, the plaintiff must admit proof on that question as well.
The two questions of proof present in risk contribution lead litiga-
tion, but not present in DES litigation, benefits the defendants; it
raises the likelihood that they will prevail.  Given, the relative dif-
ficulty of proof that lead plaintiffs face, in comparison to DES
plaintiffs, the shrill cries opposing the application of the risk con-
tribution doctrine to lead cases rings rather hollow.
B. The Common Aim of Res Ipsa, Alternative Liability,
Market Share Liability, and Risk Contribution
Liability
All of the differences that distinguish lead cases reviewed
under the risk contribution doctrine from cases reviewed under
res ipsa, alternative liability, and market share liability in the
DES context inure the the defendants’ relative benefit.  Neverthe-
less, it is the similarities among the four doctrines that further
underscore the viability of applying risk contribution in lead
cases.
Our examination of the theories reveals that they have
sprung from each other in succession.  Their interrelationship in
34http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol26/iss1/5
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this manner shows that each is the logical extension of the one
before, developed to address advancing technology and circum-
stances unforeseen by the early English common law. All attempt
to give a plaintiff redress against culpable defendants when the
plaintiff is injured under circumstances which the plaintiff previ-
ously would have been without remedy. As we have explained, the
policy underlying this dates back to the early part of the last cen-
tury. The common aim of the theories to effectuate the policy of
extending redress to an innocent plaintiff against a culpable de-
fendant underscores the wisdom of the theories in general, and
the application of risk contribution to the lead poisoning cases
specifically.
One of the central similarities between the theories is that,
properly applied, each is triggered only when all defendants
breached their duty of care.145  As such, each is tied to the tradi-
tional tort concept of cause-in-fact; if a defendant can prove that it
could not have been the cause-in-fact of the plaintiff’s injury, it
can avoid liability.146  This requirement is particularly notable in
lead poisoning cases.  In a lead case, a defendant has the ability to
obtain dismissal by showing that it did not produce white lead car-
bonate pigment.  If it was not a manufacturer of the pigment,
then, by definition, it can not possibly be a cause-in-fact of the
plaintiff’s injuries.
What is more, alternative liability, market share liability, and
risk contribution liability are all undergirded by the same policy
consideration of subjecting to liability those who create a risk of
harm.  What underlies the formulation of alternative liability, for
example, is judicial recognition not only that the defendants were
negligent toward the plaintiff, but also that the defendants’ negli-
gence created a certain risk that the particular harm suffered
would result.147  One lesson from Summers, therefore, is that “in
some circumstances at least, a defendant who is not the cause-in-
fact of plaintiff’s injury may be held liable for it if he helps to cre-
ate the risk that the kind of injury the plaintiff actually suffered”
145. Some courts unfortunately have applied res ipsa loquitor in cases in which
there exists no evidence to indicate certain defendants, among multiple defendants,
breached a duty of care. See, e.g., Ybarra v. Spangard, 154 P.2d 687 (Cal. 1944).  We
submit that in such circumstance, courts should refrain from applying res ipsa lo-
quitor. Accord Seavey, supra note 19.
146. Firak, The Developing Policy Characterics of Cause-In-Fact, supra note 144, at
324.
147. Firak, Alternative Forms of Liability, supra note 144, at 1055.
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would result.148  Market share and risk contribution liability hold
similarly: a defendant’s breach of duty towards a plaintiff, result-
ing in the creation of the kind of risk that produces the plaintiff’s
injury, is sufficient to expose the defendant to liability.149
“[A]doption [of risk contribution] rests squarely on the court’s pol-
icy decision to recognize participation in risk-creating activity as
generating potential liability in order to compensate plaintiffs
who have suffered real injuries but who are unable to meet tradi-
tional cause-in-fact requirements.”150  This expression common to
alternative liability, market share liability, and risk contribution
liability serves the policy of according fairness to an injured plain-
tiff and holding responsible risk creators.
Contrary to the assertions of Gray and Faulk, the embodi-
ment of this policy in the common law is neither new nor radical.
In fact, cases holding “that if the defendant’s conduct increased
the risk of harm to the plaintiff, the fact that the plaintiff cannot
prove definitely that the harm resulted from the defendant’s negli-
gence does not necessarily prevent the plaintiff from recovering”
date back to at least 1885!151
C. It is Intended that the Common Law Be Flexible and
Changeable
It is widely recognized that courts are charged with develop-
ing the common law in response to fact patterns.  They are free to
engage in such development without deference to the other
branches of government.  Indeed, “in developing the common law,
courts look at the other branches only to ensure that the legisla-
ture has not already spoken on an issue; they then seek to create
workable public policy.”152
The development of each of these theories at various times
over the last century is a direct result of the inherent flexibility
and ability of the courts to fashion appropriate remedies to mod-
ern day dilemmas.  In the words of the Collins court:
We have recognized that: “[i]nherent in the common law is a dy-
namic principle which allows it to grow and to tailor itself to
148. Id. at 1056.
149. Id. at 1062.
150. Id. at 1065.
151. Seavey, supra note 19, at 648 (citing Reynolds v. Texas & Pac. R.R., 37 La. 694
(1885)).
152. Lynn Adelman & Shelley Fite, Exercising Judicial Power: A Response to The
Wisconsin Supreme Courts Critics, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 425, 440 (2007).
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meet changing needs within the doctrine of stare decisis, which,
if correctly understood, was not static and did not forever pre-
vent the courts from reversing themselves or from applying
principles of common law to new situations as the need
arose.”153
Similarly, as at least one commentator has noted:
The developments of res ipsa loquitor, alternative liability, con-
cert of action, contributory negligence, and products liability all
evidence judicial acknowledgement of the need for change in the
common law when stare decisis inhibits rather than promotes
justice.154
D. Gray & Faulk’s Factual Arguments are Rebuttable
Gray and Faulk attempt to undercut the Wisconsin Supreme
Court’s decision in the Thomas case by engaging in a series of fac-
tual arguments.  Each of these factual arguments is unavailing.
Gray and Faulk begin by attempting to undercut the long-ac-
cepted tort policy that, when an innocent plaintiff is unable to
pinpoint the injuring party among a cadre of culpable actors, the
cadre is in the best position to incur the cost of injury.  They do so
by attempting to displace blame for lead poisoning from the manu-
facturers of the toxic product to those who own properties whose
surfaces are covered by the toxic product, stating that “the manu-
facturers did nothing to permit or promote the decades of neglect
and inadequate maintenance by landowners that ultimately pro-
duced the alleged exposures [to leaded pigments] . . . .”155
The premise of Gray and Faulk’s argument may be undercut
both factually and legally. Legally, the issue that Gray and Faulk
allude to is actually one of superseding, intervening cause.  How-
ever, Wisconsin follows the minority rationale espoused in Pal-
153. Collins, 342 N.W.2d at 45 (citing Bielski v. Schulze, 114 N.W.2d 105 (Wis.
1962)). See also Gauer v. Harrant, 557 A.2d 210, 216 (Md. 1989) (“[A]s we have often
noted, the common law of this State is ‘subject to judicial modification in the light of
modern circumstances or increased knowledge.’ Indeed, we have not hesitated to
change the common law by adopting a new cause of action where such a course was
compelled by changing circumstances. Even the doctrine of stare decisis does not pre-
vent us from ‘changing or modifying a common law rule by judicial decision where we
find, in light of changed conditions or increased knowledge, that the rule has become
unsound in the circumstances of modern life, a vestige of the past, no longer suitable
to our people.’”).
154. Russell, supra note 144, at 1102. See also Robert E. Keeton, Creative Con-
tinuity in the Law of Torts, 75 HARV. L. REV. 463 (1962).
155. Gray & Faulk, supra note 10, at 152.
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sgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co.,156 establishing that everyone
owes a duty of care to the entire world.157  Further, Wisconsin fol-
lows an equally broad cause-in-fact rule, thus eliminating the doc-
trines of superseding and intervening cause.158  In Fandrey v.
American Family Mutual Insurance Company,159 the Wisconsin
Supreme Court noted that these doctrines are subsumed by a
post-trial analysis of whether liability in fact ought to be limited
by public policy considerations.160
Furthermore, Gray and Faulk’s argument is flawed because it
does not accurately reflect mainstream medical and scientific
knowledge about lead poisoning.  The most common method of ex-
posure is not, as Gray and Faulk suggest, through exposure to in-
adequately maintained surfaces that may be peeling, chipping, or
flaking, but rather through ingestion of paint dust caused by fric-
tion and impact surfaces covered with intact lead paint – such as
friction resulting from the opening and closing of a window.161  To
the extent that children are exposed to lead through chipping,
peeling paint, this development is one that the manufacturers ac-
tually foresaw.162  As noted by the Thomas court, many of the pig-
ment manufacturers “did more than simply contribute to a risk;
they knew of the harm that white lead carbonate pigments caused
and continued production and promotion of the pigment notwith-
standing that knowledge.”163 The pigment manufacturers, acting
through their trade association, chose to respond to increasing
public reports of lead poisoning by blaming the victims and their
parents.164 In 1957 the LIA’s leadership stated that “the major
source of trouble is the flaking of lead paint in the ancient slum
dwelling of our older cities,” and adding that “the problem of lead
poisoning will be with us for as long as there are slums.”165  The
conclusion of the LIA’s leadership was “until we can find a means
156. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
157. Fandrey ex rel. Connell v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 680 N.W.2d 345 n.8 (Wis.
2004) (citing A.E. Inv. Corp. v. Link Builders, Inc., 214 N.W.2d 764 (Wis. 1974)).
158. Ryan v. Cameron, 71 N.W.2d 408, 411 (Wis. 1955).
159. Fandrey, 680 N.W.2d at 351 n.8.
160. Id.; See also Alvarado v. Sersch, 662 N.W.2d 350 (Wis. 2003).
161. Thomas, 701 N.W.2d at 553.
162. Thomas, 701 N.W.2d at 536-37, n.19.
163. Id. at 558.
164. G. MARKOWITZ ET AL., DECEIT AND DENIAL, THE DEADLY POLITICS OF INDUS-
TRIAL POLLUTION 103 (University of California Press 2002).
165. Id.
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to (a) get rid of our slums, and (b) educate the relatively ineduca-
ble parent, the problem will continue to plague us.”166
Gray and Faulk are mistaken when they assert that “owners
and landlords of residences had control of a substantial portion of
the risks posed by lead-based paints – simply because lead-based
paint is not hazardous until it is neglected to the point where it
peels and flakes and is then ingested or the dust is inhaled.”167 In
truth, lead-based paint is hazardous regardless of whether it peels
or flakes.
In sum, we highlight four primary weaknesses in Gray and
Faulk’s arguments.  First, plaintiffs in lead litigation face daunt-
ing burdens of proof that plaintiffs in the DES cases did not face.
Accordingly, defendants enjoy certain relative advantages under
the risk contribution doctrine.  Second, risk contribution is not the
drastic change in the law its critics claim that it is.  Risk contribu-
tion is the logical offspring of res ipsa, alternative liability, and
market share liability, because all of those doctrines share the
common aim of providing redress for an innocent plaintiff against
a culpable defendant.  Third, the risk contribution theory is not
only a logical evolution in the common law, it is also a natural
evolution in the common law. It was intended that the common
law would evolve, and it is incumbent upon courts to modify the
common law “when stare decisis inhibits rather than promotes
justice.”168 Finally, Gray and Faulk’s Article contains rebuttable
factual and legal premises.
IV. THE PRUDENCE OF PRESERVING MARKET
SHARE AND RISK CONTRIBUTION LIABILITY
FOR THE FUTURE: THE EQUITY OF
FORECLOSING IMMUNITY TO SELECT
TORTIOUS ACTORS, AND THE ENORMOUS
PUBLIC HEALTH CONSEQUECES OF
UNFORESEEN INDUSTRIAL TORTS
The vehemence with which the advocates of the lead pigment
industry, commentators, and jurists have resisted market share
and risk contribution liability, as well as the doomsday rhetoric
they have employed to disparage those doctrines, would suggest
that courts have applied these doctrines recklessly and indiscrimi-
166. Id.
167. Gray & Faulk, supra note 10, at 189 (emphasis added).
168. Russell, supra note 144, at 1102.
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nately.169  Extension of those doctrines, however, could be safely
characterized as thoughtful and measured.  Since market share
liability was first adopted by the California Supreme Court in
1980,170 five other states have followed suit, applying either mar-
ket share or risk contribution liability.171  Wisconsin first adopted
risk contribution in 1984; the Wisconsin Supreme Court applied
that doctrine to a DES case.172  It took twenty-one years for the
court to apply risk contribution to another context, lead paint.173
Thus, the evolution of market share and risk contribution liability
169. See, e.g., Gray & Faulk, supra note 10, at 153 (“[P]laintiffs [advocating the
extension of market share or risk contribution theories] are not asking courts merely
to take a small step further along an already ‘slippery slope.’  Instead, they are asking
the court to leap into an unknown abyss where all defendants are assumed guilty –
even if the presence of their product cannot be shown to have any connection with the
injury.  In this ‘ends justify the means’ argument, the . . . plaintiffs seek to force an
entire industry into the role of unfunded underwriters of judicially-created insur-
ance.”); RICK ESENBERG, A COURT UNBOUND? THE RECENT JURISPRUDENCE OF THE
WISCONSIN SUPREME COURT 2 (2007) (Federalist Society White Paper), available at
http:www.fedsoc.org/doclib/20070329_WisconsinWhitePaper.pdf.  (“A national advo-
cacy group led by Dick Armey, former majority leader of the House of Representa-
tives, called Wisconsin a ‘Tort Hell Tundra.’”); Diane Sykes, Reflections on the
Wisconsin Supreme Court, 89 MARQ. L. REV. 723, 730 (2006) (“Apportioning risk con-
tribution liability among manufacturers of lead pigment based on market share and
relative culpability over an almost eight-decade period of time is nearly impossible as
a factual matter.”); Thomas, 701 N.W.2d at 590-91 (Prosser, J., dissenting) (“Wiscon-
sin will be the mecca of lead paint suits.  There is no statute of repose on products
liability here, and this court has now created a remedy for lead poisoning so sweeping
and draconian that it will be nearly impossible for paint companies to defend them-
selves or, frankly, for plaintiffs to lose.”).
170. Sindell, 607 P.2d 924.
171. Thomas, 701 N.W.2d 523 (extending Wisconsin’s risk contribution doctrine, a
variant of market share liability, to lead pigment); Smith v. Cutter Biological, Inc.,
823 P.2d 717 (Haw. 1991) (adopting market share liability in the context of
hemophiliacs contracting AIDS after being injected with a blood product that facili-
tates coagulation); Conley v. Boyle Drug Co., 570 So.2d 275 (Fla. 1990) (applying mar-
ket share liability to DES case); Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069 (N.Y.
1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 944 (1989) (adopting market share liability in a DES
case); Collins, 342 N.W.2d 37 (1984) (adopting risk contribution liability in the DES
context); Martin v. Abbott Labs., 689 P.2d 368 (Wash. 1984) (applying a modified ver-
sion of market share liability to a DES case).
Some states, however, have rejected plaintiffs’ invitations to adopt market share
liability. See, e.g., Sutowski v. Ely Lilly & Co., 696 N.E.2d 187 (Ohio 1998) (holding
that market share liability is not available as a remedy under Ohio products liability
law); Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co., 560 N.E.2d 324 (1990) (holding that market share lia-
bility unavailable in DES cases); Mulcahy v. Eli Lilly & Co., 386 N.W.2d 67 (Iowa
1986) (rejecting market share liability in a DES case and holding that in products
liability cases, plaintiffs must prove which manufacturer made the product that
caused the harm).
172. Collins, 342 N.W.2d 37.
173. Thomas, 701 N.W.2d 523.
40http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol26/iss1/5
\\server05\productn\P\PER\26-1\PER105.txt unknown Seq: 41  2-MAR-09 8:41
2009] NEGLIGENCE IN THE PAINT 219
has proceeded incrementally and slowly, as the common law is in-
tended to proceed.
It would be unfortunate, however, if market share and risk
contribution liability, as well as courts’ willingness to modify the
common law to create such doctrines, came to a permanent halt
now, as some commentators advocate.  The demise of common law
modification that keeps tort principles in step with manufacturer
negligence would result in anomalous and inequitable variations
in tort law and would expose society to enormous, and perhaps
unnecessary, cost.
A. Doctrines Such as Risk Contribution Prevent
Anomalous and Inequitable Results in Tort Law
Industrial innovation resulting in new, previously
unimagined products is certain to continue.  Yet, regardless of the
extent of those innovations, the “bedrock rule” of tort law, that all
have a duty to refrain from engaging in conduct that may result in
foreseeable harm, must apply in all situations.  By decrying the
modification of tort law elements to ensure the “bedrock rule” is
observed in circumstances in which it may otherwise be outstrip-
ped by industrial innovation, however, Gray and Faulk—as well
as the other critics of risk contribution liability—necessarily
champion a common law that applies selectively. For, when indus-
trial innovation outpaces—or transcends—the existing parame-
ters of tort law, then those engaged in the novel industry are
placed in the privileged and unprecedented position of being
granted immunity from adherence to the “bedrock rule.”  In such
circumstance, society would be left with an asymmetrical and in-
equitable tort law in which the “bedrock rule” applies to the vast
majority, but does not apply to a select few.174  Hence, in an ironic
twist, it is not the Faulk-and-Gray-bemoaned willingness of courts
174. Gray and Faulk, and the critics of risk contribution, in effect sacrifice the ele-
ment of duty on the alter of causation.  The preservation of cause-in-fact, which they
advocate, yields the result that lead pigment manufacturers are absolved of the pre-
eminent element of tort law – duty: regardless of the foreseeable injury the lead pig-
ment manufacturers’ conduct created, the manufacturers are immune from
accountability for instances of that foreseeable injury, because their conduct obscures
the identity of the injury-causing party.
The position of the detractors of risk contribution is ironic.  They claim to resist
risk contribution, in part, out of keeping the traditional understanding of cause-in-
fact intact, but in doing so precipitate a change to duty. See, e.g., Gray & Faulk, supra
note 10, at 149-42; Sykes, supra note 171, at 731. Duty is the element that must
remain intact, however, to ensure that “the obligations of manufacturer to consumer”
are maintained. Sindell, 607 P.2d at 935.
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to modify tort that represents the radical departure in the law;
rather, it is the failure of courts to modify tort law that ensures
that the element of duty continues to apply uniformly to all that
represents the departure.  Doctrines such as risk contribution
rightly preserve the status quo of the “bedrock rule” of duty.
B. Society’s Exposure to Enormous Costs
Industrial progress has given rise to varying useful products
and medicines that were previously unimagined.  Lamentably, the
tortious production of a select few of these products, such as DES
and lead-based paint, has proven widely harmful. It is likely that
other products, unforeseen today but manufactured tortiously in
the future, will cause additional mass latent injuries.  Moreover, it
is likely that even the current state of tort law, which recognizes
such doctrines as market share and risk contribution liability, will
be insufficient to address all future mass torts.  The danger such
products pose to society is so great, there must exist a mechanism
for a civil means of resolution of the disputes that are sure to re-
sult from the potentially catastrophic consequences.
The threat tortiously-produced products pose to our medical
and educational infrastructure cannot be intelligently discounted
as pie-in-the-sky supposition.  Courts and commentators have en-
deavored to quantify the costs associated with the harms wrought
by DES and lead-based paint.  Numerous estimates place the
damages wrought by DES in the billions of dollars.175
The cost of harm produced by lead-based paint is even more
startling.  Because elevated levels of lead deleteriously affect cog-
nitive and social functions, researchers and governmental task
forces have reasonably hypothesized that elevated lead levels will
in turn affect education level, employment, and earnings.176  The
long-term monetary costs of childhood lead poisoning, “assuming
175. Mike D. Murphy, Note, Market Share Liability New York Style: Negligence in
the Air? Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly and Co., 55 MO. L. REV. 1047, 1048-49 (1990); David A.
Fischer, Products Liability: An Analysis of Market Share Liability, 34 VAND. L.
REV.1623 (1981); Nlaraine R. Allen, Note, A Remedy for the “DES Daughters”: Prod-
ucts Liability Without the Identification Requirement, 42 U. PITT. L. REV. 669, 691
(1981); James A. Henderson, Jr., Products Liability, DES Litigation: The Tidal Wave
Approaches the Shore, 3 CORP. L. REV. 143, 144 (1980); Naomi Sheiner, Comment,
DES and a Proposed Theory of Enterprise Liability, 46 FORDHAM L. Rev. 963, 968 n.21
(1978).
176. American Academy of Pediatrics, supra note 104, at 8.
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that the effect of lead on IQ is linear and permanent,”177 and also
assuming “a specific economic value of increased IQs,” are astro-
nomical.178 One group of researchers estimated that the lifetime
costs resulting from the number of children exposed to lead each
year to be $48 billion per annum.179
Finally, the rhetoric and doomsday pronouncements from
critics of these legal theories must be grounded in fact, and not in
speculation.  Contrary to the commentators’ dire predictions, the
business environment as we know it has not ground to a halt as a
result of any court determination on market share or risk contri-
bution.180  While critics claim that decisions such as Thomas will
cause a sudden and dramatic decline in the number of enterprises
willing to do business in states recognizing market share or risk
contribution, those critics, including Gray and Faulk, have not
produced any evidence that such decline has ever taken place.
CONCLUSION
To fully assess whether a court strikes an appropriate balance
between competing interests in the course of defining the law, it is
necessary to ascertain the degree to which the competing interests
are fairly considered.  In this instance, the Thomas court adhered
to a time tested legal paradigm articulated over twenty years
before and fairly considered the competing interests of the public,
the hundreds of thousands of innocent victims, and the degree of
culpable conduct involved in creating the risk of harm on the
other:
177. Numerous studies have uncovered a consistent correlation between elevated
blood lead levels and lower IQ.  The Committee on Environmental Health recaps some
of these studies:
Blood lead concentration is associated with lower IQ scores as IQ becomes
testable reliably, which is at approximately five years of age.  The
strength of the association is similar from study to study; as blood lead
concentrations increase by ten [micrograms per deciliter], the IQ at five
years of age and later decreases two to three points.  Canfield et al re-
cently extended the relationship between blood lead concentration and IQ
to blood lead concentrations less than ten [micrograms per deciliter].
They observed a decrease in IQ of more than seven points over the first
ten [micrograms per deciliter] of lifetime average blood lead concentra-
tion.  Bellinger and Needleman subsequently reported a similarly steep
slope in a reanalysis of data from their study of children with blood lead
concentrations similar to those in the Canfield et al study.
Id. at 6.
178. Id. at 8.
179. Id.
180. See, e.g., Thomas, 701 N.W.2d at 590-91 (Prosser, J.,  dissenting).
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There is no dispute that Thomas is an innocent plaintiff who is
probably not at fault and will be forced to bear a significant cost
of his injuries if he is not allowed to sue the possibly negligent
Pigment Manufacturers.  Further given the disturbing numbers
of victims of lead poisoning from ingesting lead paint, and given
that white lead carbonate was the overwhelming pigment added
to that paint, it is clear from the summary judgment record that
we are not dealing with an isolated or unique set of circum-
stances.  As far as the summary judgment record reveals, the
problem of lead poisoning from white lead carbonate is real; it is
widespread; and it is a public health catastrophe that is poised
to linger for quite some time.
The main policy reasons identified by Collins warrant extension
of the risk-contribution theory here.
First, the record makes clear that the Pigment manufacturers
“contributed to the risk of injury to the public and, conse-
quently, the risk of injury to individual plaintiffs such as”
Thomas.
Many of the individual defendants or their predecessors-in-in-
terest did more than simply contribute to a risk; they knew of
the harm white lead carbonate pigments caused and continued
production and promotion of the pigment notwithstanding that
knowledge. Some manufacturers, paradoxically, even promoted
their nonleaded based pigments as alternatives that were safe
in that they did not pose the risk of lead poisoning.  For those
that did not have explicit knowledge of the harm they were en-
gendering, given the growing medical literature in the early
part of the century, Thomas’s historical experts, Markowitz and
Rosner, submit that by the 1920s the entire industry knew or
should have known of the dangers of its products and should
have ceased producing the lead pigments, including white lead
carbonate.  In short, we agree with Thomas that the record eas-
ily establishes the Pigment Manufacturers’ culpability for, at a
minimum, contribution to creating a risk of injury to the public.
Second, as compared to Thomas, the Pigment Manufacturers
are in a better position to absorb the cost of the injury. They can
insure themselves against liability, absorb the damage award,
or pass the cost along to the consuming public as a cost of doing
business.  As we concluded in Collins, it is better to have the
Pigment Manufacturers or consumers share the cost of the in-
jury rather than place the burden on the innocent plaintiff.181
181. Thomas, 701 N.W.2d at 558.
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This passage makes evident that the Thomas court strove to
strike a balance between the competing interests only after a care-
ful and exhaustive consideration of the factual record relevant to
evaluating those competing interests.  The Thomas court did not
try to create a false sense of moral equivalency between the hun-
dreds of thousands of innocent lead poisoned children and the cul-
pable pigment manufacturers, all of whom created an
unreasonable risk of harm.  This reluctance by the majority
stands in stark contrast to one of the dissents in the case, which
betrays a desire to subordinate the interests of lead poisoned chil-
dren to the interests of the pigment manufacturers who poisoned
them.182
A review of the often cited cases which have rejected the ap-
plication of market share to lead poisoning cases demonstrates a
similar bias in favor of the lead pigment manufacturers.  For ex-
ample, in Santiago v. Sherwin Williams, the trial court engaged in
no meaningful discussion of the nature or scope of the public
health catastrophe created by the use of white lead carbonate as a
pigment in residential paints, nor did the court review the histori-
cal conduct of the pigment manufacturers.183
The truly remarkable thing about the Thomas court’s decision
was that it resisted the inclination of other courts to ignore both
the historical nature of the culpable conduct that created the risk
of harm, as well as the scope of the harm actually created.  In-
stead, by focusing on the true evidence in the voluminous record,
the Thomas court was able to chart a course that remained true to
the ideals of the risk contribution theory it had enunciated more
than two decades before, and to the delicate balance that must be
stuck between the interest of the injured and the rights of the
defendants.
182. “Today, the majority proclaims that if a plaintiff is sympathetic enough and
the ‘industry’ of which a defendant was a part of is culpable enough, a plaintiff may
dispense with proof of the third element and recover against a party even though it
has not been shown that the party reasonably could have contributed in some way to
the plaintiff’s actual injury.” Id. at 550-51 (Wilcox, J., dissenting).
183. 782 F.Supp. 186, 194 (D. Mass. 1992).  The amazing degree to which this con-
clusion is at war with the historical facts is illustrated by the clear record set forth in
Federal Trade Commission v. National Lead, 352 U.S. 419 (1957) and Federal Trade
Commission v. National Lead, 227 F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1955).
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